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ABSTRACT 
 
Film is a means of entertainment that has the power to influence people’s 
perceptions on different topics, among them gender. This paper addresses transgender as it 
is expressed in film, which is a means of observing gender identities and social practices. 
The aim of this thesis is to analyse the extent to which one can apply a gender performative 
approach to transgender and how transgender identity and performativity are represented in 
films. 
The introduction discusses the relationship between film and ideology as well as 
provides a brief overview of the historical representation of gender minorities in film. The 
first chapter is a theoretical analysis of transgender identity and performative subversion on 
the basis of Judith Butler’s works Gender Trouble (1990) and Bodies that Matter (1993), 
criticism of her works, and a discussion of the experience of transgender. The second 
chapter provides a comparative analysis of the protagonists of two films, Transamerica 
(2005) and Breakfast on Pluto (2005), based on the representation of their transgender 
identities, performative acts and communication with different social groups. The 
conclusion summarises the main findings of the analysis. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Film has been one of the most influential examples of 20
th
-century popular culture. 
Frequently, film is perceived to be merely a means of entertainment and people do not 
critically think about the information presented to them (Gauntlett 2002: 2). Film is an 
important subject of analysis precisely because its impression of being only entertainment 
enables it to transmit ideologies covertly and influence the way viewers think and conduct 
themselves (Gauntlett 2002: 2). Ideology, in the context of this paper, is defined as the 
“organising and justifying ideas that people hold” that “seem to be universal truths, but are 
historically specific understandings that justify and maintain power” (Barker 2005: 85; 10). 
The relationship between film and ideology has been analysed in various ways. According 
to Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer (2001: 74), a customer of the media is subjected 
to a controlled range of ideas presented by the culture industry. While these theoreticians 
of the Frankfurt School believe that the viewer cannot escape from the numbing ideology 
of popular culture (Horkheimer, Adorno 2001: 73), later theoreticians have argued that the 
influence of film is not so straightforward. John Fiske agrees to the extent that there is a 
‘preferred’ reading of a cultural text; however, he believes that meanings are multiple and 
the audience can choose how they interpret popular culture and what they accept or reject 
(Gauntlett 2002: 24). According to this view, ideology does not have an unwavering and 
direct influence. This does not mean, however, that ideology loses its importance in the 
study of popular culture but rather that we need to analyse it in a nuanced manner. 
Film theory has drawn upon many theoreticians of ideology. Marxist philosopher 
Louis Althusser (1984: 44) states that “there is no practice except by and in ideology”, 
which feminist film scholars later adopted as a means of locating patriarchal ideology as 
the prevailing discourse in film (Hollows 2000: 45). He also states that “there is no 
ideology except by … and for subjects”, which is linked to his notion of ‘interpellation’, 
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the hailing of an individual into subjecthood by ideology (Althusser 1984: 44; 48). The 
category of subject is necessary for ideology because subjects consequently function under 
its influence while believing ideology is natural. Film theory later uses Althusser’s concept 
to explain the political effect of film, as film has a similar power to interpellate the viewer 
as a subject (also a gendered subject) and position the subject in a way that film’s 
representations are seen as reality (Lapsley, Westlake 2006: 12). The Althusserian 
perspective demonstrates that film not only transmits the existing ideology but also has the 
power to produce it. 
Film theory has also drawn upon the work of semioticians, Umberto Eco and 
Stephen Heath among others. One of the discrepancies between them and Althusser 
concerns the latter’s assumption that a pre-given individual is interpellated as a subject by 
a pre-given representation (Lapsley, Westlake 2006: 54). Heath sees the viewer not in a 
fixed position but in relation to the film text which makes signs or meanings for the subject 
to read, as a result of which he believes that subject formation is a process (Heath 1978: 
58). Eco emphasises the importance of context in reading the signs a film provides (Eco 
1976: 604). In other words, different viewers can read a film differently. Both Eco and 
Heath see film as a construction of an imaginary reality (Heath 1978: 68; Eco 1976: 604). 
Film produces particular notions of reality while leaving the impression of being a window 
to the world (Hollows 2000: 45). It has this quality because it represents the imaginary 
reality through the lens of a prevailing “common sense” ideology and, as a result, a film 
can leave the impression of representing the truth to audiences immersed in discourses and 
ideologies (Lapsley, Westlake 2006: 60).  
Film is significant because it “transforms the world into discourse” (Lapsley, 
Westlake 2006: 40). Both the subject and reality exist within discourse (Lapsley, Westlake 
2006: 21), which is the central concept of Michel Foucault’s poststructuralist work. 
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Although critical of both Marxist and semiotics approaches, Foucault shares some points 
of emphasis with them, such as the constructedness of the subject and reality (Foucault 
1978: 60). Foucault’s approach is more productive than Althusser’s due to its use of power 
as dynamic, not a fixed substance (Gauntlett 2002: 117). Power is not something that 
ideology has over the subject but something that is produced by discourse; it is fluid and 
enables resistance (Foucault 1978: 95). Power can be used by both the ideology and the 
subject. This paper uses a combination of the aforementioned theories, making use of 
Althusser’s ideas on ideology and interpellation, while keeping in mind Heath and Eco’s 
importance of context and how subject formation is as a process, in light of Foucault’s 
theory of power discourse, in order to provide a more dynamic and agentive insight into 
the nature of ideology and its influence in film. 
According to Foucault, discourses shape the way people perceive the world as well 
as how they perceive themselves and mainstream film is a widespread channel for 
disseminating prevailing discourses (Gauntlett 2002: 133). Cinema gives people access to 
narratives, identities and situations that they would not encounter in their everyday lives 
and film may provide the only image of certain identities the viewer comes into contact 
with. Consequently, film may influence viewers’ perceptions on different topics. It has the 
power to make things visible but also keep certain issues invisible. Following Foucault, we 
could say that film can police what is made available to the viewer (Lapsley, Westlake 
2006: 20). Although film is not a tool in the hands of the ruling cultural hegemony, it often 
represents a prevailing ideology in a concealed way, which results in some topics or 
identities being invisible or (mis)represented in a manner that leaves a limited image of 
reality. This is a key issue in the relationship between film and gender ideologies. 
One of the ideologies that films represent is that of gender, more specifically the 
notion of normative binary heterosexual hegemony. The traditional gender system is based 
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on the opposition of men and women. Each individual is assigned a sex, either male or 
female, at the moment of birth, or even earlier nowadays. This identification is believed to 
be the foundation of their self-identity (Barker 2005: 283). Through this naming a person is 
interpellated, using Althusser’s (1984: 44) term, as an exclusionary gendered subject on the 
basis of a cultural hegemony where the subject-status of a person depends on whether they 
have a stable gender identity. The traditional and essentialist view is that gender is directly 
derived from biological sex. The second-wave feminist movement of the 1970s argued for 
a sex-gender distinction (Barker 2005: 240), which distinguished between gender as a 
cultural construction and sex as a biological materiality. Gender is not something one is but 
“a set of meanings that sexes assume” (Cranny-Francis et al 2003: 3). Gender is fluid in the 
sense that different societies identify particular gender behaviour differently: what is 
considered masculine is one may be feminine in the other. Moreover, all individuals exist 
on a gender continuum as they fill different social roles, not in its extreme ends (hyper-
feminine or hyper-masculine). 
However, the sex-gender distinction has been questioned by numerous authors 
(Barker 2005: 282). They point out that without contesting the essential binariness of the 
sexes, binary heterosexuality remains the norm, complicating the defence of the rights of 
sexual minorities that the norm invalidates. Later theoreticians, like Judith Butler, have 
found both gender and sex to be culturally constructed. As a result of this, a wider 
understanding of gender politics and its non-binariness, through the example of gays, 
lesbians, bisexuals, transgenders, has emerged. This is the main subject of study of queer 
theory, which emerged when the feminist movement started asking radical questions about 
gender roles and brought marginalised groups into public attention. Queer is “an approach 
to sexuality and identity” that argues against the binariness of sexes, rejects the hetero-
homo binary that limits sexualities and sees identity in general as fluid (Cranny-Francis et 
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al 2003: 76). The deconstruction of the sex-gender distinction has enabled to demonstrate 
normative sex as a cultural construction, which will be analysed in depth in the theoretical 
chapter of this paper, and offers an alternative reading of gender that challenges the 
currently ruling dichotomous system. 
However, the gender system itself has generally remained binary due to the 
physical marking of sex on the body, which leaves the impression of naturalness. 
Following the binary ideology, intersex children, who have gender-ambiguous bodies, are 
raised as either male or female on the recommendation of medical experts (Cranny-Francis 
et al 2003: 5). Transgender people, however, are not exhaustively representable by the 
gender assigned to them at birth and, according to Stephen Whittle (2002: 6) and Anne 
Fausto-Sterling (2000: 51), a significant number of people in general do not fit into the 
binary sites of sex. Since the dominant ideology does not recognise genders outside the 
binary, alternative gender representations are usually made to fit the two binary categories 
or are claimed unintelligible by presenting them as an exception or as a marginalised 
abnormality. It is in the interest of ideological institutions such as the patriarchal 
heterosexual hegemony to maintain fixed identities (Cranny-Francis et al 2003: 55).  
Film may also contribute to the stability of this hegemony as film not only transmits 
ideology but also (re)produces and upholds it, and, as a result, an iteration of gender as 
binary leaves the viewer with a limited image of gender diversity. It is important to study 
gender ideologies in film because its production of ideology is not obvious. Moreover, 
according to Joelle Ruby Ryan (2009: 5), film can both reinforce the dominant gender 
ideology as well as provoke a re-examination of it. The representation of transgender is the 
main subject of interest of this paper because trans is a complex gender identity, it has both 
the power to affirm and subvert the binary gender ideology, and it has been one of the most 
underrepresented gender identities in film. 
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Before continuing with the analysis of transgender in film it is important to make a 
distinction between the different terms pertaining to transpersons. Many terms, such as 
‘third gender’, ‘transgenderist’, ‘genderqueer’, exist to describe these complicated 
identities (Ryan 2009: 7). ‘Transgender’ is a widely used umbrella term that covers all 
individuals whose gender identity does not conform to normative sex/gender relations; it 
includes a variety of identities: transsexuals, butch lesbians, cross-dressers, drag queens, 
etc (Namaste 2000: 1). ‘Transsexual’ is a subcategory that refers to transgendered people 
who feel a rift between their gender identity and their material body or sex (Namaste 2000: 
1). One of the main things used to differentiate transsexual from transgender is that a 
majority of transsexuals want to go through sex reassignment surgery while transgender 
people may not feel such a need. Since ‘transsexual’ is a term not preferred by many 
transsexuals themselves (Whittle 2002: 7), this thesis will use ‘transgender’ or ‘trans’ as a 
less-exclusionary term and make the difference with ‘transsexual’ when needed. Both 
terms are relatively new and complex due to the numerous fluid identities they comprise. 
Heterosexual relationships, which are based on the opposition of men and women, 
have been one of the most popular topics of the film industry since its inception. Films 
have traditionally been very heteronormative and the representation of any transgressive or 
“deviant” behaviours has been strictly sanctioned (Ryan 2009: 84). Most alternative gender 
identities were almost invisible in television and film up to the second half of the 20
th
 
century. Before that, if they were represented, they were not “real” but stereotypes that 
made fun of the idea of alternative genders (Russo 1987: 28). When homosexuality finally 
appears in film, it is repressed, as in The Children’s Hour (1961) where lesbianism is a 
“dirty secret”, or incorporated as something alien or sinister, as in The Boston Strangler 
(1968), where the main suspects are homosexuals (Russo 1987: 72). Later films, which 
abandon this pathologising image, focus on the sexuality not the humanity of gays and 
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lesbians (Russo 1987: 133). The representation of gay becomes more “normal” only when 
films begin to show homosexuals as humans who face social difficulties (Beautiful Thing 
(1996)) and are placed in the context of love and relationships (Making Love (1982) and 
Prick Up Your Ears (1987)). According to Russo (1987: 221), films should explore not gay 
people but human beings who happen to be gay, and “how their lives intersect with the 
dominant culture”. 
Homosexuality has gone through a myriad of representations in the cinema. While 
some aspects of gay as humorous remain in popular culture, for example the gay friend as 
an accessory in the series Sex and the City (1998–2004), nowadays, gay has become 
normalised, which can be seen on the basis of series such as Queer as Folk (2000–2005) 
and Modern Family (2009). Homosexuals now appear in television and films in the way 
that Russo believed they should – as persons not just as a sexual orientation.  The 
normalisation of homosexuality was already a goal of the gay liberation movement of the 
1970s, who asked Hollywood to “reinforce the myth that homosexuals are just like 
heterosexuals except for their attraction to the members of the same sex” (Russo 1987: 
134), which was then denied. This is closely linked to the fact that they were an invisible 
minority at the time, but have now become a visible part of society. Gays and lesbians no 
longer seem very different from heterosexuals in contemporary popular culture. Visibility 
and adaptability are key issues.  
An analogy can be drawn between homosexuality and transgender, which has been 
similarly invisible or misrepresented in different genres, including television and film 
(Ryan 2009: 15). The media is one of the few places where most people come into contact 
with transgender, through people like Chaz Bono from the US television show Dancing 
with the Stars (2005) and Isis King from America’s Next Top Model (2008). However, 
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these examples are few and far between. The progress of trans representation and 
acceptance in society can be found by looking at the history of transgender in films. 
In the second half of the 20
th
 century the representation of transgender characters in 
films began as pathologising. Many characters were presented as deviant, monstrous or 
murderous as in Psycho (1960), Dressed to Kill (1980) and Silence of the Lambs (1991). In 
Psycho a man dresses as a woman to commit murder; Dressed to Kill sees a trans woman 
killing the women who have scorned him; and the murderer in Silence of the Lambs skins 
his female victims in order to make a “woman suit”. The image of transgendered people is 
equated with being dangerous (Feinberg 2006: 220). Such a representation of transgender 
distorts the image of transpersons and potentially leaves the impression that their 
pathologies come from their non-normative gender identity. These films “contribute to a 
cultural climate that perpetuates transphobia” (Ryan 2009: 22). Another popular way of 
presenting transgender has been farce. Cross-dressing in the name of entertainment in 
Tootsie (1982) and Mrs Doubtfire (1993) creates comic relief on the basis of drag. The 
characters may not be trans but the sign under which they operate is made abject (Ryan 
2009: 117). Such a representation makes fun of the visual side of transgender people, even 
if they are overall represented sympathetically. 
Similarly to homosexuality, transgender has been represented as comical, for 
example the embarrassing Las Vegas drag queen father of Chandler in the series Friends 
(1994–2004). However, gay has now become normalised in popular culture and 
transgender is likely to be on the same path, with sympathetic representations beginning to 
appear in series Ally McBeal (1997–2002) and Glee (2009). The images of transgender 
have become more varied “since the beginning of the trans movement in the early 1990s” 
(Ryan 2009: 17). While several television series have shown trans people in supporting 
roles, some films have had transgendered people as protagonists, with both female-to-male 
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(e.g. Boys Don’t Cry (1999)) and male-to-female (e.g. Normal (2003)) examples. More 
current transgender films tend to represent a more realistic and “normal” image of 
transpersons than the past pathologising or parodying, adding their perspective and 
everyday experience to the film. Ryan (2009: 18) calls the two films under analysis in this 
thesis, Breakfast on Pluto (2005) and Transamerica (2005), films that “break new ground 
due to their more complex representations”. 
Transamerica and Breakfast on Pluto are films by directors who have generally not 
made traditional mainstream films. Neil Jordan is famous for representing unconventional 
relationships, for example the incestuous attraction in The Miracle (1991). Jordan has, 
previously to Breakfast on Pluto, also represented transgender characters, as in his well-
known film The Crying Game (1992). In addition to alternative gender and sexuality, the 
latter film shares the topic of the Troubles in the 1970s in Ireland. Similarly to Jordan, 
Duncan Tucker is known for representing alternative sexualities prior to Transamerica. His 
Boys to Men (2001) is a four-part anthology of homosexuality, which represents the 
development of gay love from young to old age. Due to Jordan’s and Tucker’s tendencies 
to represent queer identities and non-normative sexualities in a non-stigmatising manner, 
they can be well subjected to Butlerian analysis. 
Transamerica and Breakfast on Pluto are a good point of comparison of the 
representation of transgender in contemporary film. They offer a sample of transgender 
films from both the US and the UK. Representing a transperson in a way that is not 
pathologising, comical or victimised is the first step towards presenting the audience with a 
more authentic image of trans and both these films abandon the over-simplified and highly 
stereotypical representations of the past. Analysing contemporary films on this topic is 
significant because they can show what image of transgender is presented to a wider 
audience and this, in turn, may influence people’s opinions about transpersons. It is 
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important for people to gain a better understanding of transgender. The more people see 
them from an equal standpoint, the less likely they will be to marginalise or inflict violence 
on transpersons. Furthermore, the analysis attempts to identify whether popular culture is 
showing a tendency towards gender fluidity or whether transgender is used to verify the 
ruling binary gender ideology. 
Gender and its representation have been an important topic in the feminist theory of 
the 20
th
 century. This paper aims to discuss how theory is applicable to the representation 
of transgender identity on the basis of film. Transamerica and Breakfast on Pluto are 
analysed in light of Judith Butler’s theories of gender identity and performativity, based on 
her works Gender Trouble (1990) and Bodies that Matter (1993). Her poststructuralist 
approaches to gender, performativity and subversion continue to be some of the most 
influential writings in gender studies regardless of the criticism her work has received. 
Although Butler does not address the topic of transgender in depth, she states in the 1999 
preface to Gender Trouble that she should have included it. Butler readdresses transgender 
to some extent in Bodies that Matter and uses film analysis to illustrate her ideas. This 
paper places Butler’s approach to gender in dialogue with approaches of transgender 
theorists and it is written in the context of critical commentary that Butler’s writings have 
created. 
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 1 THEORY 
1.1 JUDITH BUTLER 
Judith Butler is a poststructuralist philosopher, feminist and queer theorist, one of 
the best-known contemporary critical thinkers on the topic of gender whose work has been 
and continues to be quoted in a wide range of fields. Butler has drawn on the work of 
numerous theoreticians, among them psychoanalysts Sigmund Freud and Jacques Lacan, 
poststructuralists Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida, and feminist philosophers Luce 
Irigaray and Julia Kristeva. The theoretical part of this paper concentrates not on Butler’s 
analysis of the aforementioned writers but her concepts of subjectivity, performativity and 
subversion that have emerged from her readings of these and many other theorists. In order 
to understand Butler’s approach to gender it is necessary to place her theories in the 
historical context of general discourse on gender. 
1.1.1 HISTORY OF THE BINARY 
The binary heterosexual hegemony of Western culture originates from the historical 
patriarchal gender hierarchy (Cranny-Francis et al 2003: 15). The discourse of power has 
made two genders, male and female, the only intelligible forms of gender. Science, which 
has the value of truth in Western culture, has been used as an ideological tool to maintain 
the binary cultural category of gender and to map other identities such as sexuality, race 
and class onto the binary system (Fausto-Sterling 2000: 39). When theories of gender 
equality appeared in the 18
th
 and 19
th
 centuries, challenging fundamental social and 
economic institutions (Fausto-Sterling 2000: 39), science was used to maintain gender 
hierarchy. Physical differences in the bodies and brains of men and women, whites and 
blacks, higher- and lower-class people, were emphasised to invalidate the marginalised 
groups’ claims for social, economic, political and cultural rights (Laqueur 1992: 152). 
Biology cannot be separated from the political in this context. A look into the history of 
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scientific work on gender and sex provides insight into how the binary system has emerged 
and managed to appear both natural and true. 
The binariness of sex can be dated back to the 18
th
 century when “sex as we know it 
was invented” (Laqueur 1992: 149). Prior to this time, from the ancient Greeks to the 17th 
century, a one-sex model prevailed, according to which men and women had the same 
genital organs with the difference that women’s were internal while men’s were external 
(Laqueur 1992: 26). The scientific discoveries that distinguished male and female genitalia 
allowed the appearance of a two-sex model (Laqueur 1992: 149). According to Thomas 
Laqueur (1992: 151), there are two explanations as to how the two sexes were, and 
continue to be, invented: epistemological and political. The epistemological comes from 
the link between the symbolic and the natural; the hierarchical order is claimed to derive 
from nature. The political, explained in the previous paragraph, is in connection to limiting 
rights to white higher-class males. This does not mean that prior to the 18
th
 century 
minorities such as women and black people had many social rights. Dichotomous 
categories that limited social and political rights can be dated back to the ancient Greeks 
(Gatens 1991: 92).  The difference is that their lesser status was derived from gender in the 
one-sex model but devolved onto sex in the two-sex model (Laqueur 1992: 151). Turning 
to nature makes a stronger case for the social hierarchical division of genders and it was 
this binary framework of social gender deriving from natural sex that began to take hold in 
the 18
th
 century (Goldner: 2011: 160). This division of natural and social later becomes 
central for the feminist sex-gender distinction, one of the most widely used concepts in 
later debates about gender (Gatens 1991: 98).  
Since the 1970s, the categories of binary sex and gender have been debated in 
social sciences and gender studies. In the sex-gender model, sex is defined as the biological 
differences or “anatomically determined physical attributes” of a body, while gender is 
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seen as cultural or “the behavioural expression of the self” and “the social forces that 
mould [that] behaviour” (Fausto-Sterling 2000: 3; 4). Laqueur (1992: 124) argues that 
biological sex is not a concrete foundation for gender; nevertheless, sex constantly 
threatens to subvert gender. While arguing for the disjuncture of gender and sex, 1970s 
feminists failed to question the naturalness of binary physical sex, which led to challenges 
to feminist critique with the help of biological difference, cognitive function and behaviour 
as a result of sex difference in the brain (Fausto-Sterling 2000: 4). These arguments 
prompted some feminists to not return to biological essentialism but to also begin to 
question the category of sex, although some continue to support the sex-gender model 
(Fausto-Sterling 2000: 4). 
Many theorists have found the need to collapse the distinction between sex and 
gender in order to show how sex as we know it is not as natural as it appears. In order to do 
this, it is not enough to recognise that the categories of ‘man’ and ‘woman’ are not fixed in 
nature; it is necessary to recognise that they are not fixed by anything at all (Antony 1998: 
74). This claim is linked to the deconstruction of the subject as the source of sex. Moira 
Gatens (1992: 144) argues that the sex-gender distinction creates a split between body and 
consciousness, as a result of which the body is seen as a neutral ground onto which gender 
is written. However, a body is never neutral; it is always already sexed, as is the subject, 
since social practices and behaviours are embedded in the subject, not just on the body or 
the consciousness (Gatens 1992: 145). This idea leads to a poststructuralist view that 
searching for a particular essence or identity as a core of sex leads back to looking for 
nature as the determiner that explains differences and similarities between people. In order 
to rid gender theory of biological determinism, it is necessary to trace back the 
construction of the appearing naturalness of sex. 
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1.1.2 DECONSTRUCTION OF SEX AND THE SUBJECT 
 In Gender Trouble, Judith Butler begins her argumentation on the deconstruction of 
sex from the premise that gender is culturally constructed, which is a generally accepted 
idea in gender studies. Butler (1999: 10) sees gender as “cultural meanings that the sexed 
body assumes”. Similarly to many feminist theorists, Butler argues against the binary 
gender system. She states that even if physically there appear to be only two sexes, “there 
is no reason to assume that genders ought also to remain as two” (Butler 1999: 10). 
However, Butler takes this matter further by suggesting that if gender is a social construct 
then sex may also be seen as a cultural construct. According to Butler (1999: 10), the 
radical discontinuity between sex and gender has brought about questions concerning the 
binariness of sex. In Bodies that Matter she asks a valid question: if sex is nature and 
gender is culture then what is left of sex after it assumes its social character as gender 
(Butler 1993: 5)? 
If sex assumes the role of gender then it is substituted by gender and itself becomes 
“a phantasmatic fiction”, as it is not possible to approach a sex prior to gender because the 
body is never interpreted outside of cultural meanings and language (Butler 1999: 6; 12). 
From a linguistic viewpoint, positing sex prior to gender would end up reading it as a 
construction of a construction – it becomes “a fiction … at a pre-linguistic site to which 
there is no access” (Butler 1993: 5). Fausto-Sterling (2000: 4) concurs that the bodily 
signals and functions that are defined as male or female cannot be separated from our ideas 
about gender. Hence, Butler (1999: 11) reaches the conclusion that sex is as culturally 
constructed as gender. The claim that sex is a fiction does not mean that Butler denies the 
existence of a physical body but that this body cannot be claimed to be natural since nature 
has a history and history is culturally constructed. Butler collapses the formerly accepted 
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sex-gender distinction to argue that there is no pre-subject sex that is not already gender 
(Salih 2002: 62). This, in turn, enables a deconstruction of what constitutes a subject. 
The ‘subject’ is usually defined as an individual self-identical autonomous being 
capable of action and rational thought; however, like many concepts it is not as natural as it 
appears (Cranny-Francis et al 2003: 10). Judith Butler, like other poststructuralists, claims 
that there is no subject prior to its construction by discourse (Salih 2002: 44). Similarly to 
sex, there is no subject that is not already part of gender discourse because bodies cannot 
have “a signifiable existence prior to the mark of their gender” (Butler 1999: 13). The 
previously mentioned notion of interpellation can also be applied to gender as the action of 
hailing a child as a ‘boy’ or a ‘girl’ into a subject (Butler 1993: 232). It links the status of 
subject closely with the category of gender so that a person’s subjecthood becomes 
dependent on their stable gender identity. Subjectivity must be obtained in order for a 
person to be considered truly and viably human. However, the binary basis of subject 
formation is a political construction, which has been discursively produced through the use 
of exclusionary practices and then legitimised through concealment of the construction 
(Butler 1999: 5). The trouble is that once the subject has been produced the exclusionary 
practices are no longer visible, which enables the binary hegemony to leave the impression 
of natural subject formation (Butler 1999: 5). Butler’s aim is to destabilise the category of 
subject in order to expose the limitations, contingencies and instabilities of existing norms 
(Salih 2002: 140). 
The deconstruction of the naturalness of sex and the subject enables Butler to 
approach a new less constricted way of looking at gender identity. The ruling gender 
hegemony represents binary gender as a result of a natural gender identity and makes an 
individual’s existence and acceptability dependent on their continuous upholding of 
normative gender behaviour (Butler 1993: 95). In order to reveal the fictitious formation of 
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gender identity, Butler (1999: 176) defines it as “a cultural history of received meanings 
that are subject to a set of imitative practices which refer back to other imitations, thus 
constructing the illusion of an original and primary gendered self”. Such an approach 
disrupts the notion of a fixed normative sex as the source of gender identity through which 
a subject is constituted. The idea that there is no pre-existing sex that is not already gender 
leads Butler to the conclusion that gender is not something one is but something that one 
does, “a set of repeated acts within a highly rigid regulatory frame” (Butler 1999: 43). 
1.1.3 PERFORMANCE AND PERFORMATIVITY 
Judith Butler is not the first to discuss gender in a performative context. Previous 
theorists (Goffman 1956, Kessler and McKenna 1978, West and Zimmermann 1987), who 
can be collectively called ethnomethodologists, have similarly argued against the sex-
gender distinction and analysed gender as doing instead of being (Brickell 2003: 158). 
Their approach can be linked to theatrical performance done by the subject. However, 
subjects are not free to perform gender whichever way they please as their actions are 
governed by social norms and restrictions (Brickell 2003: 160). Goffman (1956: 2) 
believes that social practices of gender are done in interaction in a way to gain favour 
among others, even though a person’s gender is not always as coherent as the performance 
suggests. The need to appear natural to others is further developed by Kessler and 
McKenna who believe this need makes gender performances necessarily stable, while 
Goffman maintains that they can be transgressive (Brickell 2003: 163). West and 
Zimmermann (1987: 126) look at gender not only in individual interaction but in wider 
social situations, which are shaped by the expression of gender. While gender displays, as 
Goffman calls them, can be optional, being seen by others as either male or female is not 
(West, Zimmermann 1987: 130). The issue of restricted mandatory performance of gender 
is further developed in Butler’s theory of performativity. 
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Differentiating between performance and performativity is of enormous importance 
for understanding Butler’s theory and distinguishing it from others. Butler does not see the 
subject as the actor who chooses which gender identities they perform. While the 
performance of ethnomethodology presupposes a pre-existing subject, performativity 
contests the very notion of such a subject (Salih 2002: 63). However, Butler’s (1993: 7) 
aim is not to “do away with the subject” but to question the conditions under which it 
emerges. According to Brickell (2003: 166), performativity in the Butlerian sense in linked 
to the process of invoking a subject, not to the performance by the subject. While 
‘performance’ assumes the subject as the actor who performs gendered acts, 
‘performativity’ sees discourse as the actor behind the deed (Salih 2002: 45). 
Performativity involves the cultural, historical and linguistic aspects that present 
certain performances as male or female in the binary gender discourse. According to Butler 
(1999: xv), what people believe to be the essence of gender identity is actually something 
that we create by repeated acts that stylise the body in a gendered way. As mentioned 
above, an individual’s status of being is dependent on continuously doing gender in 
relation to the norm. Butler (1999: 33) believes that the individual subject has the ability to 
perform expressions of gender but that there is no fixed gender identity behind these 
expressions. Rather, the repetitive gender performances which appear to be the results of 
gender identity are actually what constitute it (Butler 1999: 33). The idea that the subject is 
the effect and not the cause of gender is the main basis for Butler’s theory of performative 
identity (Salih 2002: 48). 
Understanding how subjects are formed is key to understanding how gender 
functions socially and psychically (Cranny-Francis et al 2003: 55). Gender does not 
happen once at the moment of birth and remain fixed (Salih 2002: 66). Butler (1993: 2) 
takes Althusser’s notion of interpellation further by claiming that the formation of a subject 
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is a process under the authoritative norms of sex. To make a more general conceptual 
rephrasing of the well-known statement by Simone de Beauvoir: one is not born, but rather 
becomes, a gender
1
. As Butler rejects the distinction between gender and sex, ‘becoming a 
gender’ begins when one’s sex is performatively constituted by interpellation of the body 
as either male or female (Butler 1999: 3). Hailing, which leaves the impression of being an 
act of language that describes sex, actually constitutes it (Salih 2002: 80). Subject 
formation continues throughout the subject’s life through performing reiterative gendered 
acts. The subject does not have a choice of whether or not to perform gender so it is more 
important to ask how gender can be performed (Butler 1999: 187). If one is hailed into sex, 
not born into it, then it must be possible to perform sex in a way that undermines the binary 
heterosexual hegemony (Salih 2002: 80). 
1.1.4 MARGINALISATION AND SUBVERSION 
The ruling ideology polices the social appearance of gender by creating the illusion 
of necessary naturalness in the repeated acts of gender (Butler 1999: 43–44). The acts that 
do not fall within the gender categories accepted by the regulatory frame do not gain 
subject-status and result in exclusion. The naturalised knowledge of gender works as a 
preemptive and violent restriction of reality (Butler 1999: xxiii). As identity depends on the 
existence of stable sex, gender and sexuality, the very notion of ‘the person’ is called into 
question with the appearance of people with incoherent gender who fail to conform to the 
gendered norms that have been claimed culturally intelligible (Butler 1999: 23). However, 
the existence of such people, such as intersex children, transgender persons and bisexuals, 
reveals the instability of the normative binary categories (Salih 2002: 49) and shows that 
the genders that are considered to be the norm are nothing more than constructs on the 
                                                          
1
 Simone de Beauvoir states in her work The Second Sex (1953) that “one is not born, but rather becomes, a 
woman” (1993: 281). 
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basis of exclusion, because people exist whose very existence exposes the arbitrariness of 
binary gender and heterosexuality. 
Thus, the ruling heterosexual hegemony has to somehow redefine the other in a 
way that does not allow it to subvert the existing system, while also keeping it as part of 
the system as a marginalised entity. The other has to be maintained in periphery, outside 
the status of subject, because it is not possible for a person to exist completely outside the 
discourse of gender (Foucault 1978: 18). Moreover, alternative gender identities can be 
exemplified as exceptions that reinforce the rule of binary heterosexual gender. Normative 
identity depends on the marginalisation of the excluded subjects as any norm is constituted 
through its exceptions (Boucher 2006: 113; 116). For example, heterosexuality’s claim to 
original status is under threat from homosexuality (Brickell 2005: 26), which is why 
homosexuality is represented in the ruling discourse as a reversed copy of the original 
heterosexuality. However, Butler (1999: 41) asserts that “gay is not to straight as copy is to 
original, but rather as copy is to copy” because there is no such thing as a natural original 
sex. The concept of original heterosexuality comes from the discourse of procreation, 
which remains the only area in which it is relevant. The need to repeat heterosexual 
constructions in non-heterosexual frames shows the constructedness of the constructs 
themselves: binary heterosexual concepts such as ‘butch’ and ‘femme’ are not natural in 
homosexual context (Butler 1999: 41) but are ways in which the binary heterosexual model 
tries to articulate the other in an intelligible way. The normative produces an intelligible 
other and then renders it unintelligible by prohibiting it (Salih 2002: 60). 
Although Butler states that gender is constrained by power structures that demand a 
constant repetition of normative gender, she also insists that it is possible to subvert these 
constraints (Salih 2002: 50). It is possible for a subject to operate from within the repressed 
interior of the matrix of power and repeat ‘the law’, the norms of the ruling hegemony, in a 
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way that displaces it by revealing its constructedness (Butler 1999: 40, 110). This claim 
supports Foucault’s (1978: 18) idea that power both controls and produces resistance. 
Subversion is where Butler sees agency. If one follows Foucault’s idea that power 
produces resistance, which creates other kinds of cultural intelligibility, then subversion 
has to exist within the practice of gender repetition (Butler 1999: 185). However, in order 
for subversion of identity to be possible it is necessary to abandon the discursively 
constructed concept of being a gender prior to culture, and “take up the tools” that enable 
gender performance (Butler 1999: 185). The system itself has produced prohibited 
identities that have the power to subvert its natural appearance. As a result, Butler (1993: 
122) believes that possibilities of subversion emerge because the law turns against itself by 
providing the conditions for its own subversion.  
Butler believes that an individual, in the automatic production of self-identity, can 
select from a restricted range of socially scripted alternative gender performances, even 
though institutional rituals have formed their subjectivity, and subvert the law (Boucher 
2006: 118). Similarly to homosexuality’s ability to disrupt heterosexuality’s claim to 
originality, the binary distinction between men and women is under risk of subversion by 
dissident forms of gendering (Brickell 2005: 26). Butler sees drag, a type of transgender, as 
a potential instance of the subversion of ruling gender norms. Drag is a double inversion: a 
man dressed in drag as a woman has the outside appearance of feminine while the inside, 
the body, is masculine; at the same time, the outside appearance, the body, is masculine 
while the inside, the self, is feminine (Butler 1999: 174). Since both claims are true, they 
create a contradiction which displaces the discourse of true and false gender (Butler 1999: 
174). Drag operates on parody and reveals that the identity that people believe to be 
original, what people think drag is imitating, is actually not the original at all (Butler 1999: 
175). The naturalistic effects of genders are an imitation of an ideal heterosexual gender, 
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which is produced by the imitations as its effect (Butler 1993a: 313). Furthermore, the 
imitation of the ideal is bound to fail precisely because it is not natural but only appears so. 
However, it must be kept in mind that parody in itself is not subversive; certain 
parodic repetitions are troubling while others become normalised and recirculated by the 
cultural hegemony (Butler 1999: 177). (For example, the cross-dressing performances of 
Tootsie and Mrs Doubtfire have been produced by the heteronormative entertainment 
industry.) Butler’s discussion of the construction of naturalised knowledge shifts from the 
example of drag to transsexuality, where neither the clothes nor the body itself may allow a 
clear and conclusive judgement about a person’s gender (Butler 1999: xxii). Subversion 
happens when cultural perceptions fail to read the body that one sees as either male or 
female, and when the reality of gender comes into question (Butler 1999: xxiii). 
Transsexuality could be seen as subversive due to the fact that it proves a discontinuity 
between gender identity and the biological body, but it has been used as a means of 
affirming the fixity of binary sex and gender as many transsexuals seek to reconcile their 
gender identity with their bodily sex. Hence, there are no acts that are always subversive 
since alternative gender performances can also work to uphold the normative. 
Consequently, subversive acts must be viewed within context (Butler 1999: xxi). 
Based on Butler’s examples of drag and transsexual in Gender Trouble and Bodies 
That Matter, one should not assume that she claims that transsexual by definition re-
establishes the binary normative ideology. Butler has later elaborated on transgender and 
transsexuality in Undoing Gender (2004). Transsexual people, similarly to intersex people, 
challenge the view that a natural dimorphism should be maintained (Butler 2004: 6). 
Although seemingly different (intersex people are opposed to the sex reassignment 
surgeries of children while transsexuals often demand them for themselves), both 
movements call for more autonomy in choosing one’s body (Butler 2004: 7). However, as 
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Butler argues against an autonomous being or having a particular gender identity, since 
one’s sense of gender is enabled and restricted through social norms, this creates a tension 
between queer theory’s opposition to stable gender categories and the transsexual desire to 
conform to the binary (Butler 2004: 8). It is important to remember that the category of 
‘sex’ is culturally framed and what constitutes a gender performance of male or female, 
feminine or masculine, changes in time, which means that the category of gender is open to 
remaking (Butler 2004: 9). Therefore, the desire of transsexuals to transform into a man or 
woman is driven by the culturally constructed idea that anatomy presumes gender (Butler 
2004: 9); a biological essentialism that Butler, like most gender theorists, wants to avoid. 
The binary heterosexual ideology does not perceive a transgender or transsexual 
person as male or female, as a result of which they are not always considered truly human. 
Like all subjects, transsexuals exist within gender discourse so they cannot choose whether 
or not to repeat gender performance; the question is how to repeat it (Butler 1999: 189). 
One option is to try to adapt to the binary normative, another way is to attempt to displace 
the ruling gender norms. Although Butler supports the latter, she admits that in order to 
remake what constitutes ‘human’ there is a certain departure from the human (Butler 2004: 
3), which is a risk most people might not be willing to take. Nevertheless, a line must be 
drawn between not being able to live without recognition and the terms under which one is 
recognised being unliveable (Butler 2004: 4). What Butler attempts to do by 
deconstructing gender is to widen the field of what constitutes sex and gender in a way that 
trans would also be included. Butler (1999: 189) addresses the need for the denaturalisation 
of identities in order to show that dissonant performances of gender also come from a 
“natural” source. If gender politics is fixed on identity and the deconstruction of identity 
reveals that a subject is not ready-made but constructed, then a new type of politics might 
emerge which would accept different non-binary sex and gender as intelligible within the 
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ruling discourse (Butler 1999: 190). Butler’s work aims to bring about social 
transformation and an end to sexual difference. However, her theories have come under 
criticism due to their approach to solving these issues. 
 
1.2 CRITICISM OF JUDITH BUTLER 
As one of the most influential writers of feminist and queer theory, Judith Butler’s 
work has received much criticism from different perspectives. Some critics have argued 
against her use of complicated and highly abstracted language that creates ambiguity and 
possible misreading. Her approach to subjectivity and identity is another source of 
criticism because it deconstructs categories that enable political movements. Butler’s 
theory of performativity has also been criticised by different authors, especially in 
connection to her idea of subversion. The latter, most pertinent to Butler’s analysis of 
transgender, has been argued against in both the fields of feminist and transgender studies. 
1.2.1 CRITICISM OF BUTLER’S SUBJECTIVITY,  
APOLITICALITY, PERFORMATIVITY AND SUBVERSION 
One of the sources of criticism of Butler’s work is her notions of agency and 
subjectivity. According to Brickell (2005: 26), Butler has changed her position on the topic 
within Gender Trouble as well as in later writings and interviews. First, it appears that 
Butler treats the subject and its agency as nothing more than discourse. However, as stated 
above, Butler does not completely do away with the subject since it is an important agent 
in her theory of subversion. While avoiding reference to a concrete self-identical subject 
with socio-political power, she takes the individual to a level of symbolic identity and pre-
discursive attachment to one’s existence (Boucher 2006: 133). The subject acts under the 
illusion of self (Brickell 2005: 27). In other words, although Butler claims that a subject is 
created in discourse, she believes in a pre-discursive desire to become a subject, which 
comes from the normative law but precedes subject formation. Boucher (2006: 121) sees 
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this as a problem because Butler does not in fact do away with the pre-discursive 
individual but renames it as auto-affection. Boucher (2006: 122) criticises Butler for 
producing a theory in which the ‘I’ as constituted through discourse and the auto-
production of self-identity that precedes discourse are in contradiction. This contradiction 
in Butler's early analysis of agency has remained unsolved. 
Another problem in Butler’s work that derives from her concept of subjectivity is 
the apolitical nature of her theory. Firstly, Butler focuses only on the individual gendered 
actions of subjects and fails to see the collective dimension of the social field (Boucher 
2006: 133; Lloyd 1999: 209), which results in Butler’s ethics reversing her politics 
(Boucher 2006: 114). Secondly, although Butler aims to support minority genders, feminist 
activists have criticised her abstracted and linguistic-centred approach as unsuitable for 
solving real-life inequalities (Bordo 2003: 291). Seyla Benhabib (1995: 21) criticises 
Butler’s concept of the subject, or rather lack of one, as a threat to autonomy, reflexivity 
and accountability, which she believes are necessary in order to bring about social change. 
Many activists have raised objections to Butler’s treatment of the subject because it lacks 
political applicability in the defence of the rights of minorities (Boucher 2006: 112). 
According to Martha Nussbaum (2012: 210), Butler undermines the very cause she 
attempts to support. Agentive subjects and definable identity categories make it possible to 
speak and make generalisations about people in a political context. However, Butler’s 
subject does not have the direct ability to criticise the ruling discourse; in her view, only 
marginal gender identities and subversive practices can supplant the hegemonic norm to a 
certain extent (Boucher 2006: 116; Nussbaum 2012: 211). 
According to Brickell (2005: 25), Butler’s concepts of performativity and 
subversion are marred by the difficulties that surround her understanding of agency and 
social structure. Brickell advocates the use of Erving Goffman’s theory of performance, 
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which he believes has a more stable use of the subject than Butler. Similarly to Butler, 
Goffman (1956: 107) argues against the essentialist idea of the subject as pre-discursive 
but, unlike Butler, he believes that the subject pre-exists the deed and the interactive 
gender performances that the subject does under the influence of the power of ideology are 
what constitute identity. However, Goffman’s view does not take into consideration the 
power of interpellation to hail a subject into a gender identity. Butler’s contribution is 
remarkable because she explains how the very notions of where people’s gender identities 
come from are already affected by the ruling heterosexual binary system. Revealing the 
illusion of naturalness, which the institution produces in a concealed way, is missing in 
Goffman’s work (Bordo 2003: 290), which is why Butler’s theory is more productive in 
connection to alternative gender identities, among them transgender.  
A lot of criticism of Butler’s performativity has come from the fact that many 
theorists have misunderstood and, thus, misrepresented performativity by reading it as 
performance (Lloyd 1999: 199), a voluntary act that the subject can do, which is against 
Butler’s (1993: x) view that “there is no subject who decides on its gender”. Moya Lloyd 
(1999: 195) argues that this misreading happens probably due to Butler’s ambiguous 
representation of the differences between performance and performativity. Although Butler 
explicitly emphasises the need to separate the two terms, Lloyd believes that perhaps there 
is no need to distinguish between performance and performativity (Lloyd 1999: 202): 
Since the performative produces that which it names, and since gender is understood in 
performative terms as the effect of the intersection of discourses and practices of gender, and 
since these discourses and practices also underpin performances, it suggests that a 
performance is itself performative. 
Through this argumentation Lloyd wants to reconcile the two terms since she believes that 
the distinction creates more questions than it answers. She attempts to show how both 
concepts rely upon the reiteration of the same norms (Lloyd 1999: 206). The difference 
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between performance and performativity lies in the subject, the agent of subversive acts, 
which, as Lloyd (1999: 209) argues, creates problems in Butler’s theory of subversion. 
Butler (1993: 241) states, as a result of her understanding of the subject, that direct 
political opposition to the norm cannot be done; rather the subject must repeat actions that 
turn the norm against itself. However, Butler (1993: 241) also states that as discursive 
productions, performatives are open to interpretation and can signify different meanings: 
both the interpellation of the subject and the parodic performances that aim to subvert the 
norm have incalculable effects. Both Lloyd (1999: 208) and Shimizu (2008: 3) criticise 
Butler’s approach because it requires recognition of the performance as either subversive 
parody or reinforcing the heterosexual matrix, which cannot be predicted due to the 
incalculability of reactions to performative acts. This ultimately creates a paradox in 
political intervention because Butler’s approach leaves the impression that subversion is 
spontaneous (Lloyd 1999: 207). According to Akiko Shimizu (2008: 3), Butler also 
concentrates too much on the visible differences
2
 that make subversion recognisable, 
which is not directly relevant in the context of this paper. 
A lot of criticism of Butler’s thought has come from misreading her theories, which 
has led her to explain and reconcile some of these claims in later works. Criticism of 
Butler’s idea of the subject as an effect of discourse comes from the fact that previous 
theories call for agentive subjects in a discourse-ruled society. However, they fail to 
explain that the subject’s actions are not only affected by discourse but also limited within 
its possibilities, something that Butler’s theory of performativity illustrates. Butler’s 
argument against a coherent gender identity comes from a problem that had arisen already 
prior to her work – that making generalisations about minorities on the basis of gender, 
although useful for political action, has drawbacks, such as disregarding the diversity 
                                                          
2
 Akiko Shimizu (2008: 3) argues that Butler’s emphasis on visible subversion, such as transgender, tends to 
push invisible non-normative identities, such as femme lesbians, further into invisibility or non-existence. 
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within one gender identity. Butler’s theory does not make generalisations that exclude 
anyone; rather she attempts to widen the discussion in order for different identities to be 
equally represented without the need to push some into the periphery. In regards to her 
subversion, which is criticised for its incalculable effects, the same can be said about direct 
political attempts at transcendence, as the effects of any action cannot be contained within 
the subject’s intent because they depend on the context in which they emerge. Although 
Butler has received valuable criticism and some of these points remain unaddressed by her, 
the strengths of her theory outweigh its shortcomings. 
1.2.2 CRITICISM OF BUTLER IN THE CONTEXT OF TRANS 
Butler’s criticism in trans-context is embedded in a history of tension between 
feminist, queer and transgender theories in their approach to transgender. Early feminist 
and queer activists tried to separate from transgender people who were seen as invading 
feminist and homosexual discourse (Whittle 2006: 196). Some examples of this are the 
policy of The Michigan Womyn's Music Festival to limit admittance to women-born-
women and Janice Raymond’s The Transsexual Empire (1979), which claims that “all 
[male-to-female] transsexuals rape women’s bodies” by invading women’s space “in order 
to exercise male dominance and aggression” and “to subvert the feminist movement” 
(Raymond 2006: 134; 131). Later theorists have abandoned this radical viewpoint but 
tension remains and can be observed in the different approaches that theoreticians have 
taken to trans. Kate Bornstein (1994: 72) argues against ‘gender terrorists’ who defend the 
“natural” gender system and sees transsexuals as either ‘gender outlaws’ or conformist 
with the dominant system. She seems to support the outlaws as “eventually the gender 
system lets everyone down” (Bornstein 1994: 80). Bernice Hausman (1995: 1) 
concentrates on mainstream transsexual experience and argues against the transsexual 
identity’s high dependency of surgery because she believes that this risks reinstating 
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dichotomous gender. According to trans theorist Patricia Elliot (2010: 37), these views 
show how queer theorists value transgressive transgender identities more highly than 
conventional transsexual identities. 
Queer theory has defined the terms of debate on transgendered people since the 
1990s, which is why many transgender theorists have begun to criticise these approaches 
because of their limited views on transgender. Jay Prosser (1998: 59) argues that 
poststructuralist feminist and queer theories are altogether irreconcilable with transsexual 
narratives, as they ignore the particular experience of the body and its importance to the 
understanding of the self. Viviane Namaste (2000: 14–16) believes that queer theorists 
negate transgender identities by reading them only as tools of a theory and ignoring the 
political activism of the subjects within the transsexual community, the social context in 
which transgender practices are produced, and distorting the diversity within transgendered 
communities. Namaste (2000: 16) accuses queer theory of neglecting the individual 
transgender people and their everyday lives by reducing them to rhetorical figures that 
serve the feminist and queer agendas but offer nothing in return for transgender people. As 
one of its most influential writers, Judith Butler has received much criticism as a feminist 
and queer theorist. Prosser (1998: 24) sees Butler as the one who has most transformed 
transgender into a queer icon, which is why he chooses her work as his object of criticism. 
Prosser (1998: 5) believes that theoretical approaches to transgender, such as 
Butler’s, should be changed in order to better represent the materiality of transsexual 
narratives. According to Prosser (1998: 9), a transsexual is an authorial being, which is in 
contradiction with Butler’s performativity. Furthermore, Butler’s abstract and fluid 
approach to identity has led her to being accused of ignoring the materiality of the body. 
This is an issue of great importance in the context of transgender, especially transsexual 
experience, as the body is what “drives their understanding of themselves as transsexed” 
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(Devor 1999: 207). Prosser (1998: 40) criticises Butler for rejecting the materiality of the 
body, which she claims to be a phantasmic fiction. However, Shimizu (2008: 9–10) 
defends Butler in that she believes this criticism comes from misunderstanding and 
Butler’s claim, that sex or the materiality of the body is a constructed fantasy, does not 
imply a negation of materiality altogether. What Butler (2004: 214) states is that “what 
operates at the level of cultural fantasy is not ... dissociable from the ways in which 
material life is organised”. Prosser (1998: 43) opts for an ontological status of the body as 
felt by the self and argues for a narrative experience of transsexuality. Although his 
approach takes into consideration transsexual lives, Prosser himself has been criticised for 
reducing the experience of the body to the ontological materiality of the body, which is 
ultimately unsatisfactory because it conceals the subject (Shimizu 2008: 5; Elliot 2001: 
312). According to Elliot (2001: 312), both Butler and Prosser make the mistake of judging 
either essentialism or transcendence: Butler sees essentialism as bad and subversion as 
good, while Prosser rather supports essentialism and criticises the demand for subversion. 
Neither approach is exhaustive as they do not describe the different varieties of 
transgender. 
Butler’s support and promotion of subversion has led Prosser (1998: 32) to accuse 
her of claiming that all transgendered people are by definition queer in that they disrupt the 
notion of binary gender. Prosser (1998: 45; 58) argues that many transsexed people are 
anything but queer and Butler does not consider to what extent transgender and transsexual 
people might not want to be included “under the queer banner”. Furthermore, Prosser 
believes that Butler’s argumentation of subversion makes transsexuals necessarily 
conformist, while transgender is represented as queer and subversive (Shimizu 2008: 13). 
While Butler does use drag as a possible example of revealing the unoriginal status of 
heterosexual binary gender and transsexuality as an example of how trans can be used to 
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reify the norm, she mentions already in Gender Trouble, and emphasises this in her later 
works, that subversion has to be viewed in context and not all transgender acts are 
subversive (Butler 1999: 177). However, some trans theorists, such as Namaste, have 
found that although Butler claims the importance of context she does not necessarily 
follow this idea. 
According to Namaste (2000: 10), Butler’s analysis of drag as revealing the 
imitative structure of gender fails to take into account the context in which drag 
performances occur – restricted to the stage in a gay male culture. Butler does not mention 
the already excluded situation in which drag exists in connection to homosexuals. Drag, as 
something that happens on stage, is reduced to only performance and denied identity. 
Transsexuals experience a similar staging: in order to represent their own identities as 
“natural”, lesbians and gays position others as ‘anomalies’ (Namaste 2000: 12). Namaste 
(2000: 13) claims that the moment that drag underlines the constructed nature of gendered 
performance, the subversion that Butler hopes for, drag is contained as a performance in 
itself and loses the right to a “true” identity, which gay has established. In order to refrain 
from being reduced to performance, transgender identities need to opt for normalisation 
within the ruling system. As a result of this, transgender identities that refuse to subvert the 
norm can be criticised for supporting the hegemony, which creates an anti-transsexual 
discourse (Namaste 2000: 14). Both Prosser and Namaste criticise Butler for making 
transsexuality an object of criticism. 
Butler’s theory of subversion and her aims to theorise on a subverted society are 
seen as idealist and trans activists are more concerned with the institutions in place at the 
moment (Elliot 2010: 43). While Butler (2004: 76) argues against the ruling discourse’s 
insistence that transsexuality is a ‘gender identity disorder’, which positions transsexuals as 
abnormal, trans people see things from a more practical viewpoint since this medical status 
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is what allows them to gain access to sex reassignment surgery (Elliot 2010: 43). Trans 
people have to convincingly narrate their transsexuality in order to be diagnosed as 
transsexed and receive the right for surgery (Devor 1999: 208). The everyday interests of 
transsexuals are in contradiction with Butler’s argument against the rhetoric in which trans 
people are represented. Butler (2004: 90) claims that if normative gender structures, which 
her work aims to deconstruct, did not exist then there would be no need for a diagnosis of 
gender identity disorder. Nevertheless, many transsexuals claim to have a conflict between 
the internal self and external body (Prosser 1998: 70), which does not fit well with Butler’s 
idea that there is no internal gender identity. 
Elliot, Prosser and Namaste, among other transsexual theorists and activists, argue 
against Butler’s insistence that transsexuals’ self-perception is controlled by the regulatory 
apparatuses of normative gender ideology, that they are “dupes of that gender order” 
(Elliot 2010: 47). Although Butler states this about all subjects, not exclusively 
transsexuals, and her aim is to liberate all people from the confines of normative gender, 
transgender theorists find this idea to be undermining of the transsexual experience. 
However, some arguments on the topic of transsexual feelings speak against this objection. 
According to Prosser (1998: 84): 
The body of transsexual becoming is born out of a yearning for the perfect past – that is, not 
memory but nostalgia: the desire for the purified version of what was, not to the return to 
home per se but to the romanticised ideal of home. 
Calling stable gender the romanticised ideal shows that what transsexuals strive for is not a 
“real” sex but a social construction of ideal gender that has been created in historical 
context within the ruling gender ideology. This statement by Prosser seems to ultimately 
support Butler’s claim that “sex is a regulatory ideal” (Butler 1993: 1). Butler (1999: 119) 
hopes that the culturally constructed body will eventually, through subversion and freedom 
from paternal norms, be liberated not to its “natural” past but an open future of cultural 
possibilities. 
35 
 
Although Butler’s ideas advocate more freedom and diversity to transgender 
identities, the tension between Butler and transsexual experience remains as her ideas are 
too distant from the daily lives of trans people. According to Namaste and Prosser, the 
lives of transsexed people are already burdened by trying to live as male or female and 
they should not have to take up the “revolutionary burden to refuse gender” (Elliot 2010: 
38). Furthermore, queering transgender identities goes against the aim of many trans 
activists who want to normalise trans within the norms of the law. Butler’s aim is to 
normalise transgender in its queerness, which is more difficult to achieve. Prosser (1998: 
80) argues against Butler in that a transsexual cannot be a person before they acquire a 
belief in identity and the continuity of the self in their own bodies. Butler (2004: 39) has 
later admitted that in order for life to be liveable, certain normative conditions, one of 
which is a degree of stability, are necessary. However, she concludes that a call to extend 
these norms is necessary. 
A great extent of Butler’s criticism from transgender theorists comes from a 
historical misrepresentation of transgender by feminist and queer studies. Trans critics, 
such as Prosser, Namaste and Elliot, aim to defend the conventional transsexuals from the 
demand for queerness. While it is true that Butler believes in subversion through queering 
gender, she does not demand subversion; rather she attempts to disrupt the system which 
demands conventionality in order to liberate identities that do not have a stable binary 
gender identity. While most transsexuals feel they have a gender core in contradiction with 
their body, the individuals wanting surgery have to narrate wanting to be the ‘opposite’ 
sex. It is important to note that exclusion exists between normative and alternative gender 
representations, as well as within and between minorities: normalising heterosexuality 
before homosexuality, gay before transgender, and traditional transsexuals before 
ambiguous transgender people results in a hierarchy based on exclusion. Many trans 
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theorists, such as Stephen Whittle and Joelle Ruby Ryan, support Butler’s approach 
because it places all gender identities and their variants on an equal level. 
Although there is an extent to which Butler’s identity, performativity and 
subversion are applicable to the real lives of transgender people, her theories can be 
successfully analysed on the basis of film. This paper discusses the ways protagonists are 
interpellated as gendered subjects, how transgender characters are positioned in society, 
and whether the films under analysis follow a binary or queer approach to gender. Figuring 
out what type of gender identities transgender is associated with enables to see if and how 
the diversity of transgender is represented in films. In order to not fall under the same 
criticism as Butler, the film analysis attempts to avoid any judgement of either subversive 
or conformist gender performances and instead concentrates on how the films represent or 
conceal the issues surrounding transgender that have been discussed by Butler and her 
critics. 
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2 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF TRANSAMERICA AND BREAKFAST ON PLUTO 
 
The protagonist of Transamerica (TA), Bree Osbourne, is a pre-operative male-to-
female transsexual who lives full-time as a woman but needs to receive her psychiatrist’s 
and therapist’s permission to get sex reassignment surgery. This desired outcome is 
postponed by the appearance of a teenage boy named Toby who calls Bree’s home in 
search of Stanley, Toby’s father and Bree’s male identity. As a result, Bree’s therapist 
withholds her signature because she wants Bree to come to terms with her past before 
making a finite change. The film takes Bree on a road trip across the US, as she tries to 
solve the situation with Toby and make it back home in time for her surgery. Transamerica 
has been generally well-received by the public as a transgender film. The themes of 
transgender identity, performance and social disapproval of transpersons are all 
represented in the film.  
Breakfast on Pluto (BOP) is a bildungsroman, a coming of age story, of Patrick 
‘Kitten’ Braden, an orphan living in a small town in Ireland in the 1960s and 1970s, during 
the time of the Troubles. This film represents the development of a male-to-female 
transgendered person from a young age as he discovers his identity, faces lack of social 
acceptance and begins to pass as a different gender than that of his birth. One of the main 
storylines surrounds Patrick’s search for his biological mother who had abandoned him as 
a child. The main themes in Breakfast on Pluto are transgender identity, performance and 
the fluidity of gender in different contexts. Both films try to give authentic representations 
of transgender experience and offer the personal journeys of their protagonists as 
transgendered individuals. They present a positive image of the transgender viewpoint, 
although in different ways. 
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2.1 TRANSGENDER IN NARRATIVE 
What makes transgender films potentially subversive is subject choice: representing 
transgender people makes visible marginal identities that do not easily fit into the 
normative frame. However, films can present transgender very differently, which is why it 
is important to analyse how transgender is represented. One of the first things that Butler 
(1993: 129) suggests should be asked when analysing a film is “What reading does the film 
encourage?” Transamerica concentrates mostly on being transgender. Bree’s visual 
performance of conventional gender, her aim of complete passing and her desire for sex 
reassignment surgery make the film conform to binary gender norms and, thus, it can be 
criticised for portraying only the most normalised type of transgender. Breakfast on Pluto 
represents transgender in a more ambiguous and less conformist way in that Kitten can be 
identified as differently gendered throughout the film, revealing different possibilities of 
transgender identity. Breakfast on Pluto also represents sexuality in a more elaborate way 
than Transamerica, which follows a very heteronormative model. As a result, 
Transamerica encourages a more normative reading than Breakfast on Pluto, which offers 
alternative possibilities of its protagonist’s identity. Transamerica is more stereotypical 
because it is centred on the desire of complete surgical transition. 
2.1.1 SEX REASSIGNMENT SURGERY 
Since the 1980s, transsexualism has been defined by psychiatrists as a mental 
disorder that requires professional intervention (Whittle 2002: 19). In 1994, the medical 
term ‘transsexual’ was replaced by ‘gender identity disorder’ which means that in order to 
obtain hormone therapy or sex reassignment surgery (SRS), an individual is required to 
show signs of mental disturbance (Whittle 2002: 20). Transamerica offers an authentic 
representation of this medico-legal environment with which transsexuals have to 
communicate. The film shows how the Bree, in order to receive legal right for her surgery, 
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has to acquire a consent form signed by both her psychiatrist and her therapist. As her 
psychiatrist states, “The American Psychiatric Association categorises gender dysphoria as 
a very serious mental disorder” (TA). According to Charles Shepherdson (2006: 96), the 
medical institution has to discover who they [transsexuals] really are, based on which the 
decision is made whether or not to allow surgery. However, if one follows the Butlerian 
argument that there is no “real” subject or “authentic personality”, only the effect of 
various performances (Shepherdson 2006: 97), it is not possible for psychiatrists to decide 
on whether a transsexual is “truly” a man or a woman. 
Historically, the desire for surgery led many transsexuals to tell a practiced story, 
which was known and accepted in SRS clinics, in order to get their surgery (Stone 2006: 
228). Psychiatrists preferred a coherent transsexual experience, a transition from one end 
of the binary male-female scale to the other. However, the stories that individuals told were 
not necessarily authentic transsexual narratives but what the clinics wanted to hear. These 
stories of transsexuals were told within a highly regulatory frame which does not allow 
alternative representations of trans other than the one accepted by the ruling ideology. 
Winning the right to surgical and legal sex changes, however, [has] exacted a price: the 
reinforcement of a two-gender system. By requesting surgery to make their bodies match their 
gender, transsexuals enact the logical extreme of the medical profession’s philosophy that 
within an individual’s body, sex and gender must conform. (Fausto-Sterling 2000: 107) 
Transamerica indirectly refers to this tendency when Bree’s psychiatrist tells her, “There’s 
no such thing as a right answer in this office” (TA). Bree’s psychiatrist senses her 
willingness to be dishonest: Bree is willing to say whatever is necessary in order to obtain 
the right for surgery. Thus, Bree reinforces the traditional transsexual narrative. 
In addition to asking what reading a film encourages, Butler (1993: 129) also 
believes that it is important to ask what a film conceals. Transamerica leaves an 
unquestioned impression that SRS is only the demand of the subject, not mentioning that 
this demand also exists within gender discourse. Similarly to Butler, Shepherdson (2006: 
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99) argues that surgery appears as a choice but in fact comes from the other and is a 
requirement with which the subject has agreed to comply. Transamerica, like its 
protagonist Bree, does not openly call into question the medical establishment, which 
requires the applicants of surgery to fit into certain moulds in order to obtain the right for 
SRS. There is only one instance when Bree asks her psychiatrist, “Don’t you find it odd 
that plastic surgery can cure a mental disorder?” (TA) However, she does not take this 
further as her desire for surgery is greater than her desire to protest against how she is 
treated by the medical institution. This coincides with Bornstein’s (1994: 83) claim that 
transsexuals will not attack the system until they are free of the need to participate in it. 
Bree is afraid to speak up because she does not want to be an outcast, which is why she 
prefers to conform to the society that does not accept her. While Butler argues against the 
abjectifying medical discourse, Bree’s example illustrates how Elliot (2010: 43) is right in 
claiming that Butler’s approach is too distant from the everyday lives and needs of 
transsexuals. If they did not conform to the conditions that are set for surgery, they would 
not be granted permission to have it. 
Transamerica only represents transsexuals like Bree who want to exist within the 
current gender system as long as they are allowed access to surgery. The film does not 
discuss how “the medical regime permits only the production of gender-normative altered 
bodies” (Spade 2006: 319). All transgender people have to accept the label of ‘transsexual’ 
(and the status of mental disorder that comes with it) and, although there are people who 
may want to be the ‘opposite’ sex, others who do not have to pretend in order to obtain 
right for hormone therapy or any kind of surgery. It is made necessary to produce a 
coherent transsexual narrative that is based on the opposition of sexes and complete 
transition (Feinberg 1998: 63). Moreover, there are transgender people who prefer to 
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remain in transition and enjoy their in-between status
3
. Representing only the stereotypical 
transsexual transition story results in failing to address the fluidity that transgender 
identities often inhabit. 
2.1.2 PERSONAL TRANSITION STORIES 
According to Ryan (2009: 19), a media image is a double-edge sword that has the 
power to shape people’s perceptions on transgender through either creating or challenging 
stereotypes. Transamerica does not take advantage of the opportunity to represent trans 
identities to the audience as “normal” already in the transition phase, which is outside the 
normative gender system, not just after surgery. According to Butler (2004: 64–65), “the 
point is to try to imagine a world in which individuals with mixed or indeterminate genital 
attributes might be accepted and loved without having to undergo transformation into a 
more socially coherent or normative version of gender”. Breakfast on Pluto, which hardly 
mentions the idea of having surgery, gives a more “normal” image of its protagonist Kitten 
while in transition. It is not necessary for Kitten to completely erase her maleness in order 
to be perceived as female. While Breakfast on Pluto tries to represent transgender as 
acceptable in the form that it takes, Transamerica attempts to normalise transgender by 
complying with the ruling binary gender ideology. The normalisation of transgender, 
although widely supported by trans activists, has its limitations: labouring under the notion 
that normal equals binary results in the marginalisation of transgender varieties that do not 
fit the norm or over-stereotyping the identities that do.  
The individual transition story, which has been the most common way of 
representing transgender in film, has several drawbacks (Ryan 2009: 18). Firstly, the 
overrepresentation of passing as a “real” gender can result in the demand for all 
transgender people to pass. However, many individuals, especially male-to-female 
                                                          
3
 Michael Schulman addresses the issue of the numerous trans identities that exist without representation in 
his article entitled Generation LGBTQIA (New York Times 2013, January 9) 
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transsexuals, do not possess the physical attributes to pass as feminine. Secondly, if most 
films only represent transgender identities that want to pass then it leaves a false 
impression of the diversity of transgender identities that prefer to remain queer. Thirdly, 
most transition stories, among them Transamerica and Breakfast on Pluto, limit their 
representation of transgender to issues such as sexuality, sex reassignment surgery and 
non-accepting family members, but fail to address larger issues, such as the problems of 
the binary gender system and civil rights issues concerning trans people (Ryan 2009: 18). 
There is a need to find a balance between the representation of transsexual everyday 
experience, which trans critics believe lacks in Butler’s argumentation, and the criticism of 
the binary gender system, which is underrepresented in transgender films. Ryan (2009: 18) 
believes that the social, cultural and political aspects of trans people’s lives should be more 
represented in films; however, both Butler and the transgender films analysed in this paper 
mainly focus on individual identity and personal interaction. 
 
2.2 TRANSGENDER PERFORMATIVITY 
Personal transition stories usually concentrate on transgender identity, the 
representation of which is of interest to this paper. One way of analysing how a film can 
express transgender identity is by looking at how a transgender character is interpellated. 
For this, it is necessary to observe whether a transperson is represented as either 
male/female or as ambiguously gendered. Transamerica represents a binary view of gender 
and places its protagonist into this ideology. Since the film hails Bree as once having been 
male but now being almost female, transsexuality is represented as a transition from one to 
the other. Breakfast on Pluto provides an image of transgender that is queerer than the 
dichotomous model. Since Kitten is interpellated as both male and female in different parts 
of the film, transgender itself seems more fluid. As a transperson can be played in a film by 
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an actor, the choice of who to cast to play a transgender woman is an interesting subject of 
analysis from the perspective of interpellation. 
2.2.1 INTERPELLATION 
On the one hand, casting a famous actress like Felicity Huffman as a transperson in 
Transamerica shows how the representation of transgender in popular culture has gained 
importance, as a well-known face brings more viewers. On the other hand, the director 
Duncan Tucker has been criticised for casting a woman, not a man or an actual transsexual 
woman, to play a male-to-female transsexual (Roberts 2006: 34). In his defence, Tucker 
states in an interview that he did not think a transsexual looks like “a man in a dress” and 
that he had wanted to “honour where Bree was going instead of leaving her anchored in 
what she had left behind” (Roberts 2006: 34). Although Tucker’s idea seems like a 
compliment to transsexuals, it is based strongly on the idea of complete passing within the 
binary gender system. It leaves the impression that the transition period, most represented 
in the film, is only a means to an end, a temporary condition before becoming a “true” 
gender. However, many transsexuals delay or end up choosing not to have SRS, an option 
that this film does not consider. 
Tucker’s choice to cast Felicity Huffman and concentrate only on Bree as a woman 
pushes her past as Stanley into invisibility. However, this goes directly into conflict with 
what Bree’s therapist tells her in the film. When Bree talks about the phone call she 
received from Stanley’s son Toby, the therapist corrects her, stating that Bree should not 
use third person as “Stanley’s life is [her] life” (TA). Tucker’s choice to emphasise Bree’s 
future as a woman leaves her past as a man and her present as a transitioning transsexual 
invisible. The past is an important and often underrepresented part of transsexual 
experience, as it reveals the possibility of being ambiguously gendered, which in turn 
disrupts the normative system. According to Butler (1993: 135), it is in the power of the 
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director to turn men into women. Although Tucker claims to represent Bree as a woman he 
does not make it a full transition. Even when Bree gets her surgery at the end of the film, 
she is not portrayed by Felicity Huffman as she would usually look like as a woman: Bree 
is not presented as attractive and her choice of make-up makes her look somewhat 
awkward. Thus, the film does not show Bree as “naturally” feminine. 
Contrary to Transamerica, Kitten is never portrayed by Cillian Murphy as either a 
man or a woman in Breakfast on Pluto (although the character prefers to be called by 
feminine pronouns). As an actor, Murphy has physically good features to play a believable 
female character. However, director Neil Jordan has stated in an interview that Murphy’s 
attractiveness does not matter since “the character wasn’t trying to be a girl” (Future 
Movies 2005). This means that it is not the intention of Jordan, unlike Tucker, to present 
the transgender character as female. One could argue that the difference comes from the 
fact that Bree is a transsexual and Kitten is a transvestite. However, in the film Kitten 
mentions the idea of having a sex change so it is not obvious whether in later life she 
would want to get SRS. It is better to avoid reviewing surgery as the only decisive factor 
that differentiates transgender from transsexual. Firstly, it leads to an essentialist view of 
ontological biological sex and, secondly, it gives operations too much importance in trans 
identity. Transsexuals themselves have stated in interviews that they do not believe surgery 
itself is “the key to womanhood” (Schrock et al 2005: 328). Ultimately, Kitten is not 
interpellated as either male or female, which results in the denaturalisation of sex. 
The protagonists of Transamerica and Breakfast on Pluto are part of the gender 
ideology that supports the idea of stable gender identity. Kitten’s character’s identity is of 
central importance in the film. She creates fairy-tale-like stories and prefers living in them 
in order to cope with the serious world that surrounds her. Femininity and the attempt to 
avoid confrontation have been part of her life since childhood, as a result of which Kitten’s 
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identity seems fixed. However, she never exclusively defines her gender in the film. Bree 
is more specific in defining her gender identity. She tells her mother that she “never had a 
son” (TA), which emphasises how Bree denies her life as Stanley. Bree’s gender is 
represented as something “within” that she needs her body to match. Thus, the film follows 
Prosser’s (1998: 43) approach of felt transsexual experience. Bree further emphasises the 
difference between inner and outer gender when she tells Toby that, “My body may be a 
work in progress but there is nothing wrong with my soul” (TA). On the one hand, this 
statement supports the idea of internal gender identity. On the other hand, it suggests that a 
transperson deserves to be considered as a human being already in their gender ambiguity, 
which is inconsistent with Bree general lack of acceptance towards queerness. In this case 
the queerness is external. Neither film directly questions the idea of an internal gender 
identity. While both characters seem to have a stable self-identity, the films suggest that 
gender can change in time. 
According to Butler (1999: 33), performances are what constitute gender. Both 
films represent situations in which gender can be read as performative. Transamerica 
begins with a voice training video where a woman instructs viewers how to speak like 
women, using a higher voice. Bree is shown practising this in a mirror. While Bree is 
shown to have to practise feminine speech, Kitten seems to have completely integrated it 
into her life. Consequently, Transamerica can be considered more subversive in that it 
reveals the difficulties of performing femininity, while Breakfast on Pluto, through making 
it look easy, fails to demonstrate the constructedness of femininity. Both films present Bree 
and Kitten walking a certain way, waving their hips and taking small steps as another way 
of performing femininity. It is a culturally constructed method of moving and all women 
need to make it look “natural” in order to be considered feminine. Again, it is Bree and not 
Kitten who reveals how this is a performance when, in a stressful situation, she forgets to 
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control her actions and sits with her legs apart (TA). As the audience is aware of her male 
identity, this act can either reveal how “unfeminine” Bree is when relaxed or show how 
performing femininity has to be constantly controlled. Kitten does not abandon her 
feminine movements even in situations of danger when she is attacked and has to run away 
(BOP). Kitten is represented as having mastered femininity.  
In Transamerica the power of performative acts to constitute gender is represented 
in a situation when Bree is in a restaurant with her family. As both Bree’s father and Toby 
have already taken their seats and are in conversation, Bree’s mother forces her to help her 
to her seat. This is a traditionally gentlemanly, and thus male, act. Through forcing her to 
perform as a man she wants to reveal Bree’s male identity and possibly hopes that making 
Bree perform maleness will cause her to abandon trying to be a woman. In order to counter 
this forced gender act, Toby offers to help Bree to her seat in return. This is because he, 
unlike Bree’s mother, respects her female identity. This performance, which allows Bree to 
be a lady, regains her some of her femininity. This situation need not result in any threat to 
Bree’s gender; however, these acts are represented in the film and perceived by Bree as 
threatening her stable gender status, which suggests that the gender performances that one 
does are important in the construction of gender. 
In addition to theatrical performances, performativity can also be linguistic. Binary 
ideology is strongly represented in performative speech acts which have the power to 
interpellate characters as male or female (Butler 1999: xxv). In a situation where Bree 
needs to explain to a policeman her relation to Toby she begins by saying “I’m his…” but 
realises that she would have to hail herself as male due to the gendered word ‘father’, so 
instead she chooses to say “He’s my son” (TA). Since her gender is difficult, or 
impossible, to explain in language, she opts for using a gender-specific name for Toby 
instead. The limited range of gender terms that language offers is also represented when a 
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little girl in a diner asks Bree “Are you a boy or a girl?” (TA) Bree does not answer her, 
and perhaps cannot answer her, as she is not “fully” male or female. Since Bree seems to 
support the binary gender system, she refrains from calling herself a “real” girl before her 
surgery, as she wants to be one after it. Another reason she cannot provide an answer is 
that she is upset for having been revealed by an eight-year-old girl, which shows that 
already children participate in policing gender. The problem with performative speech acts 
also occurs when using gendered terms in a neutral way. Toby continuously refers to Bree 
as “dude”, which Bree objects to, as it originally refers to men (TA). Bree is sensitive to 
being called anything that is associable with manhood. Performative speech acts are 
usually gender-specific and in the case of transgender, when one’s gender status is 
dubious, they may result in unwanted interpellation and they do not allow an exhaustive 
representation of gender diversity. 
There are several instances in Breakfast on Pluto where the interpellation of Kitten 
though performative speech acts is made prominent. At the beginning of the film, Patrick is 
caught in girl’s clothes and his foster mother wants him to comply with the idea that 
gender derives directly from biological sex by forcing him to say “I’m a boy, I’m not a 
girl” (BOP). This supports the idea that performative hailing is actually what constitutes 
Kitten’s gender. Kitten only ever refers to herself as a boy once, when she tries to stop her 
magician friend from kissing her. She tells him, “The thing is, Bertie, I’m not a girl”, to 
which Bertie replies, “Well I knew that, princess” (BOP). Kitten is surprised that she has 
been read as male even though she has kept up a coherent female performance. However, 
Bertie continuing to call her princess suggests that her gender does not matter. Near the 
end of the film, when Father Liam, who is also Kitten’s biological father, comes to see her 
in London, he tells Kitten, “I knew a boy like you once”, to which Kitten replies, “Oh, I’m 
not a boy, sir, I’m a girl” (BOP). This brings the interpellation from boy to girl full circle. 
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However, the transformation from one to the other gender is not central in the film. When 
Kitten meets a gang of bikers in the first half of the film their leader talks about riding on 
the road with a druid at his back. Kitten asks him “Is a druid a man or a woman?” and the 
biker replies, “That doesn’t matter. All that matters is the journey” (BOP). This answer 
represents the message of the film, which is itself a journey; although, not a journey from 
boy to girl, but the journey of Kitten’s life in general. Kitten’s transgender identity as a part 
of the film but not as its main storyline, as in the case of Bree, makes Breakfast on Pluto 
more subversive than Transamerica. 
2.2.2 SUBVERSION 
Patrick’s potentially subversive identity begins with his choice of name. He chooses 
his nickname after St Kitten, otherwise known as St Cettin, who was an acolyte of St 
Patrick (BOP). According to Patrick, St Kitten has been referred to at different times as 
both he and she. She also claims that both St Kitten and St Patrick wore dresses. As no one 
questions St Patrick’s gender, Kitten does not see why she should not be allowed to wear a 
dress. An important difference between Transamerica and Breakfast on Pluto is that 
Kitten’s male identity is not made invisible the way Bree’s is. Bree hides her masculinity 
and avoids the type of gender ambiguity that Kitten enjoys. Kitten’s story begins as Patrick 
and even when she has transformed into a woman, she refrains from being “all” woman. 
She deliberately makes her masculinity visible in certain situations in order to rid herself of 
unwanted male attention. Bree refrains from revealing her male identity at all cost. As a 
result Transamerica appears less subversive than Breakfast on Pluto, which allows queerer 
representations of gender. 
According to Butler (1993: 231), drag “serves a subversive function to the extent 
that it reflects the mundane impersonations by which heterosexually ideal genders are 
performed and naturalized and undermines their power by virtue of affecting that 
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exposure”. Although neither protagonist classifies as drag, some of their apparel suggests 
high femininity that is very characteristic of drag, such as Bree’s insistence on wearing 
pink and Kitten’s preference of lace and fur coats. The characters can denaturalise gender 
originality and stability but they can also serve the re-idealisation of heterosexual binary 
gender norms. The effect of Bree’s all-pink clothing creates a feeling of artificiality even 
though she is a transsexual woman played by a female actor. Butler (1993: 231) states that 
exposing the naturalised status of the heterosexual binary might not lead to its subversion. 
Bree’s appearance is like an impersonation of what a feminine woman should be. If the 
audience sees Bree’s femininity as a result of her feminine identity then her denaturalising 
performance does not call heterosexual norms into question but rather reinforces them. 
This seems to be the encouraged reading of the film.  
However, another reading is possible. Following from the claim that Bree’s 
femininity is perceived by the audience as artificial, this “unnaturalness” might not derive 
from the fact that she is not a “real” woman but rather that what she believes constitutes a 
“real” woman is strange and outdated. Her hyper-femininity could be read not as an 
imitation of an original gender but as revealing the unnaturalness of the demand of 
femininity; although, this is certainly not Bree’s intention. Bree actually seems not to 
perceive herself as out of the ordinary. In a situation where her sister offers her a pink 
feather jacket to wear, Bree states, “I’m a transsexual not a transvestite” (TA), which 
means she thinks transvestites “overdo it” when it comes to clothes. But her own 
“overdoing” femininity is what makes Bree somehow less feminine than a woman-born-
woman – a “real” woman need not make that much effort. Bree’s failure to seem “natural” 
coincides with Butler’s (1993: 125) claim that the idealised gender performance that the 
norm demands cannot be fully achieved, thus revealing the problematic of heterosexual 
performativity.  
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In appearance Kitten represents a similar femininity as Bree, but unlike 
Transamerica the emphasis of Breakfast on Pluto is not so much on this outward 
appearance. Jordan has stated that “the emotional heart of the character” is much more 
important to him than “all the accessories” (Future Movies 2005). Actually, Kitten does 
not try to look like any woman; she most identifies with and tries to look like a famous 
actress named Mitzi Gaynor, who people have told her strongly resembles her biological 
mother (BOP). As a result, her desire for femininity, especially high-class femininity, 
might not result from an internal female identity at all but rather a desire to be like her 
mother, something considered usual for young girls. The similarity between mother and 
‘daughter’ is also represented through Bree whose traditionally feminine behaviour, 
correcting people’s grammar and a dislike of swearing are traits that she shares with her 
mother, who is otherwise represented as an opposite to Bree (TA). As Bree’s behaviour is 
represented in the film as performative, her mother’s femininity is, through analogy, 
revealed as equally constructed. Reading Bree’s and Kitten’s femininity not as a 
naturalistic result of an internal female identity but as something that they have adopted 
from their mothers results in the possibility of subverting the idea of stable gender identity. 
Kitten, who is actually played by a male actor, leaves a more “natural” impression 
on screen than Bree. Kitten’s male and female identities do not seem to contradict and 
exclude each other. While Bree’s in-between state is something that needs to be overcome 
(TA), Kitten is able to present the in-betweenness as a possible and viable option of living 
(BOP). The film includes the representation of trans people who exist within their 
ambiguity. One of the examples of Kitten’s ambiguousness is her clothing. Due to the era 
in which the film is set, the 1970s, it is not easy to differentiate between every outfit as 
either male or female. Firstly, the fashion of the time is more androgynous than 
contemporary clothing. Secondly, it is not easy for a contemporary viewer to distinguish 
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between male and female clothing: what appears as feminine today may have been a 
fashionable male outfit back then. Kitten wears dresses and skirts but also trousers, 
although seeming to become more feminine and ladylike as the film progresses. This is 
probably linked to her moving from her small Irish town to London where she is freer to 
visibly perform her femininity. The move to London is also necessary because she can 
blend in better in an urban community and avoid confrontations that are more likely to 
occur within her Catholic hometown.  
 
2.3 MARGINALISATION AND SOCIAL INTERACTION 
 Lacking social recognition as a binary heterosexual means losing a possible social 
identity and being categorised as the other, which results in being excluded from dominant 
culture (Butler 1999: 99). Trans people are often excluded not only by society at large but 
also within smaller communities, such as the workplace, their own families and circle of 
friends. Both Transamerica and Breakfast on Pluto represent their protagonists and the 
problems that they encounter in connection with these communities. One of the important 
issues that Ryan (2009: 18) suggests should be addressed in films is discrimination against 
transgender people, which is a result of the marginalisation of trans identities. Due to their 
marginalised status transgender people are forced into situations that may not only be 
discriminatory but also potentially dangerous. 
2.3.1 DISCRIMINATION 
Previous films, such as “Psycho” (1960) and “Silence of the Lambs” (1991), have 
represented trans people as monstrous as a result of their marginalisation. Breakfast on 
Pluto makes reference to this murderous image that transgender people have been 
subjected to by society. When Kitten lives through an IRA bomb explosion in a London 
club, she is first treated as a victim. However, when her male identity is revealed she 
becomes the prime suspect of the bombing, also aided by the fact that she is Irish. The 
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newspaper headlines on screen read “Lady Killer”, “Killer Queen” and “Sweet Smile of 
Cross-dressing Killer” (BOP). Kitten is pathologised and immediately read as someone 
untrustworthy due to her decision to hide her identity. She is taken into questioning and the 
police try to beat a confession out of her. The police do not actually care if she planted the 
bomb or not, but they expect anyone to confess after taking such a beating. The 
newspapers have labelled Kitten the culprit; the police try to give the public the criminal 
they want. Although she is severely beaten she does not sign a confession. She actually 
feels safe in the hands of the police, as she has nowhere else to go. When they finally want 
to release her, Kitten begs to stay, “I just want to belong. I’d be your best prisoner” (BOP). 
This shows how Kitten feels unsafe in the world and demonstrates her inability to fit in. 
As trans people often experience both acceptance and discrimination from society, 
it is important for a multifaceted film to represent both situations. Both Transamerica and 
Breakfast on Pluto are rather positive in their representation of transgender identities 
compared to earlier films. One significant example of this is that their protagonists are still 
alive at the end of the films. In many previous transgender films, such as Paris is Burning 
(1990), The Adventures of Sebastian Cole (1998) and Boys Don’t Cry (1999), the 
transgender characters die due to their non-conformist identities. As stated by Butler 
(1993: 133), “there are cruel and fatal social constraints on denaturalization”. Such an 
ending, from a symbolic perspective, suggests a certain impossibility of transgender, as 
though it would not be possible to represent in film a situation where the characters would 
be allowed to continue on their path of gender denaturalisation. Transamerica and 
Breakfast on Pluto lack this symbolic suggestion and represent their protagonists as having 
viable lives regardless of their social exclusion. 
 Different types of marginalisation are represented in both films. Kitten falls victim 
to violent discrimination. She is on the street at night and is picked up by a man who 
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mistakes her for a prostitute (BOP). He seems to prefer her to others, which leaves the 
impression that he can read her male identity. However, his aim is not to sleep with her but 
to attack and possibly kill her, as he tries to strangle her with a wire. While her male 
identity is what gets her into trouble, Kitten’s feminine side saves her: she escapes by 
spraying perfume in her attacker’s eyes (BOP). The film represents a very real situation 
that transgender people end up in – when no one will hire them and they are in need of 
money, they turn to the streets. Actually, many transsexuals do this in order to fund their 
sex reassignment surgeries (Namaste 2000: 206). Although initially Kitten is mistaken for 
a street walker, she later deliberately tries to do it. However, she is rescued by a familiar 
police inspector who instead takes her to work at a peep-show, which is safer. In 
Transamerica, the issue of prostitution is represented through Bree’s son Toby. Bree 
would never resort to prostitution but through Toby, as Bree’s flesh and blood, the film 
creates a symbolic analogy between transgender and prostitution, hinting that one does not 
fall far from the other. 
 Resorting to prostitution is linked to an important problem in transgender people’s 
lives: the difficulty of being employed, which shows how trans people are discriminated 
against in the public sphere. The inspector who rescues Kitten asks her, “Why don’t you 
try to get a regular job?” and she replies, “To tell you the truth, inspector, I’m not that 
employable”, to which he answers “So I gathered” (BOP). The fact that the peep-show is 
the best job that Kitten can acquire shows her limited options and the reluctance of 
institutions to hire trans people. The peep-show and her previous job as a magician’s 
assistant are both built on the visualised performance of her appearance. The alternative is 
being invisible, as she was when working as a costumed mascot in a park. Kitten is never 
represented as having the possibility of a regular job. Bree’s employment possibilities are 
similarly limited. She works as a telemarketer, which makes her invisible to the people she 
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is calling. Her second job is being a dishwasher in a Mexican restaurant kitchen. Both of 
Bree’s jobs suggest that she is not suitable for direct interaction with people. Bree becomes 
a waitress in the same Mexican restaurant after her surgery, when she has a coherent 
gender. The representation of employment conditions in both films suggests that the 
protagonists’ gender identities cannot be overlooked in the public sphere and that their jobs 
either have to hide their gender or be directly based on its performative nature. “The 
‘unthinkable’ is thus fully within culture, but excluded from dominant culture” (Butler 
1999: 99). Their lack of a coherent gender results in marginalisation. 
2.3.2 COMMUNITY 
In addition to the workplace, the communities with which transgender characters 
interact are an important subject of analysis. Kitten communicates with her adopted family, 
her school, people in her town, and rogue groups of people she meets during her journey 
(BOP). When Patrick’s foster mother first catches him in a dress and wearing lipstick she 
tells him that his behaviour will humiliate their family and threatens to “march [him] up 
and down the street in disgrace in front of the whole town” (BOP). Patrick’s school shows 
similar intolerance towards him. Although they do show some leniency when they allow 
him to take up home economics and needlework class instead of physical education in 
order to keep him from causing trouble, they also reprimand him when he leaves a note 
asking “Do you know any place that there’s a good sex change?” in the school’s problem 
box, where students are asked to address issues concerning puberty (BOP). Although the 
headmaster explicitly says, “No problem should be precluded” (BOP), Kitten’s problem 
has no place among the acceptable issues of teenagers and she is suspended from school. 
Kitten’s family and school represent the general view of the entire hamlet, which becomes 
evident towards the end of the film when they burn down the home of Father Liam who 
has offered Kitten shelter. Evidently, those who try to aid outcasts are punished for it. The 
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only tolerance Kitten sees is from other outcast communities such as the musicians and 
hippies he meets on the road, or her friends. 
Breakfast on Pluto groups non-normative identities together. These social 
relationships are represented in the notion of ‘symbolic kinship’ (Butler 1993: 138). This 
kinship exists between transgender identity and other marginalised minorities, such as 
racial identity, mental disability and political radicalism. Kitten’s circle of friends includes 
a black girl named Charlie, a boy with Down syndrome named Lawrence and an IRA-
involved boy Irwin (BOP). These people accept Kitten for who she is, leaving the 
impression that tolerance is most likely to come from a source that understands social 
exclusion due to being non-normative themselves. Moreover, the film hints that the 
experience of transgender has certain similarities with the racial, disabled and political 
experiences of otherness. Kitten and her friends are all outsiders in the conservative 
environment of their small Irish town. One example of this is a scene where they try to 
enter a nightclub and the bouncer refuses to let them in, giving two reasons, “him and her”, 
which references Lawrence and Kitten (BOP). Both Lawrence and Irwin end up dying as a 
result of their otherness: Lawrence is unable to understand warnings and walks into a bomb 
planted by the IRA; Irwin is killed by his fellow IRA members after telling the police 
about some of their plans. Only Kitten and Charlie remain together as two social outcasts, 
one a transgender woman and the other a single unwed mother. 
A similar reading of symbolic kinship can be made on the basis of Transamerica. 
Although Bree strongly represents a white middle class culture, there are elements in the 
film that suggest an analogy between Bree’s otherness and that of racial others. While 
Bree’s apartment is mostly pink, there are a few African elements, statues and masks, 
decorating her home. In the beginning of the film she also chooses a book called 
Civilizations of Black Africa to place in her handbag, instead of choosing the women’s 
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magazine under it, which would make more sense as light reading in her psychiatrist’s 
waiting room. These elements introduce a symbolic connection between Bree and another 
minority culture, which is reinforced by the fact that Bree mostly interacts with racial 
others. She lives in a neighbourhood, which seems to be a suburb, but the people shown as 
she leaves the house are all non-white, mostly Mexican. Due to a lack of communication 
between Bree and the white middle class it is not clear if she would be accepted in 
dominant society. According to Butler (2004: 216), gender minorities can re-signify social 
bonds within communities of colour. In addition to hinting that Bree might be more able to 
pass or at least be accepted by other outcasts, representing Bree as analogous to racial 
others shows how transgender, similarly to race, is subjugated by the ruling discourse. 
However, the symbolic kinship in Transamerica is even more subtle than in Breakfast on 
Pluto, which means that the audience of the film might not notice this link, which is a way 
of queering an otherwise stereotypical film. In the end, this reading depends on the viewer. 
Transamerica’s representation of community response to Bree’s transgenderism is 
generally restricted due to lack of interaction with others. Unlike Kitten, Bree does not 
have friends who understand and accept her. When her psychiatrist asks her at the 
beginning of the film if she has the support of friends, Bree replies, “I’m very close to my 
therapist” (TA). Bree’s personal interaction is limited to her therapist and her son Toby. 
Bree’ psychiatrist also asks her about her family and she untruthfully tells him that they are 
dead. They actually live in Phoenix and shun her. When Bree and Toby are forced to visit 
them on their road trip due to lack of money, Bree’s mother insists on calling her Stanley. 
She also grabs her groin and, after realising she still has a penis, her mother states, “She’s 
still a boy” (TA). However, when Bree forces her mother’s hand on her breast she begins 
to cry and says, “Oh, Stanley, I can’t look at you like this!” (TA) It is evident that her 
mother believes that gender should derive from biology and Bree’s ambiguous state 
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repulses her. According to Bornstein (1994: 72), “the presence of gender outlaws is enough 
to make people sick”. The rejection of family members that is represented in both films is a 
common problem that transgender people face. 
Bree’s solitude is further represented through the brief encounter with a transgender 
community in Mary Ellen’s home in Dallas, where Bree and Toby are forced to spend the 
night on their road trip. Bree does not have any connection to the transsexual community. 
She prefers passing while the trans people she meets at the party, although some of them 
“living stealth” (TA) in the public sphere, are openly transsexual in Mary Ellen’s home in 
the presence of Bree and Toby. As Bree cannot accept her own queerness she is bothered 
by how they flaunt their gender ambiguity. Bree not only refuses to identify with them but 
opposes herself to them in front of Toby by stating that they are “phony, pretending to be 
something they’re not” (TA). Bree searches for security in conformism: as she lacks a 
support structure, she resorts to excluding others in order to uphold her own identity. 
However, as the other transgender people are not stigmatised in the film, Bree’s claim can 
leave the audience critical of her since she judges someone who she resembles. Moreover, 
Toby states, “I thought they were nice” (TA), which suggests that Bree stands alone in her 
exclusionary views. The trans people at the party are represented as “normal people”; they 
are much more at ease than Bree who tries to pass at every moment of her life. While 
Breakfast on Pluto presents a more positive image of the possibilities of connection to 
others, Transamerica leaves Bree alone in her situation, but suggests that it may be a result 
of personal choice that comes from her inability to accept herself as she is or her need to 
feel secure in society. The film seems to represent a more accepting and fluid 
understanding of gender than its protagonist. 
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2.3.3 DESIRE 
A type of communication that is often represented in film, and is a way of 
normalising certain sexualities, is relationships, which revolve around desire. Both Bree 
and Kitten being attracted to men reinforces the heterosexual binary; however, it is 
interesting to analyse how they are viewed by others. According to Laura Mulvey (1999: 
837), films usually portray women as the object of the male gaze. This is somewhat 
distorted as the protagonists of Transamerica and Breakfast on Pluto are transgender 
women. Mulvey (1999: 838) claims that the camera leaves the impression of being neutral 
while actually representing a heterosexual male gaze. Therefore, eroticism or lack of desire 
for the characters is telling. While Bree is played by an actual woman, she is rarely 
presented in a sexual manner, not to the audience nor any of the characters in the film. If 
women, as Mulvey believes, are objects of erotic gaze, then Bree is presented as a non-
woman, as she does not create desire for her. Only a Native American man she meets on 
the road seems to find her attractive. The potentially romantic relationship between him 
and Bree is put off for an unknown period of time, suggesting that if they did meet again, 
Bree would then be post-surgical and a “real” woman. This helps to stabilise the 
heterosexual norm. Bree also upholds the dichotomy between heterosexuality and 
homosexuality, as she refers to the intercourse which resulted in Toby’s conception as 
“tragically lesbian” (TA). Bree is generally represented in a non-sexual and undesirable 
manner. 
Unlike Bree, Kitten is in numerous situations as the object of male desire. The film 
begins with her walking on the street and a construction worker making sexist remarks 
towards her. She is also hit on in a London club by a man who puts his arm around her. 
However, when he realises she is not quite who she seems, he says, “Christ, you’re a 
bloke!” and backs off (BOP). The lack of interest in her as a transgender woman is a way 
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of reinforcing the binariness of desire. As Kitten is neither male nor female, she is 
represented as an impossible object of sexual affection. In the same club Kitten is later 
dancing with another man. Before the audience can guess where things will lead, a bomb 
explodes. It is possible that the director does not want to end up in a situation where Kitten 
would have to explain her condition. The film avoids allowing Kitten to enter into sexual 
relationships because that would end up revealing her other gender identity. Situations 
where trans people are revealed usually become dangerous and may result in physical 
violence. Kitten is also never shown kissing anyone, as this might appear a man kissing a 
man. It is not always clear whether or not the men who hit on her realise she is not a 
woman-born-woman. This ambiguity is what gives Breakfast on Pluto an air of queerness 
and produces potentially subversive situations. 
Although Kitten becomes the romantic interest of several men, the desire is not 
represented as homosexual, nor is it entirely heterosexual due to her physical condition. 
According to Butler (2004: 142), it is always difficult in the case of transgendered persons 
to say whether their sexuality is homosexual or heterosexual. Therefore, the film represents 
“forms of love that are not reducible to a heterosexual matrix” (Butler 1993: 127). Men’s 
desire for Kitten reveals how the heterosexual matrix is not naturally binary at all. 
However, similarly to Bree’s Native American, her admirers are outcasts and people with 
alternative lifestyles, just like Kitten. Her love interests include a biker gang leader and a 
glam rock performer named Billy Hatchett; she is also seen as attractive and desirable by 
Bertie, who hires her as his assistant (BOP). Kitten’s relationships can be seen as both 
exotic fetishism, from which the audience can absent itself, and as a subversive 
performance which calls normative heterosexuality into question (Butler 1993: 137). 
Regardless of the men’s social standing, the film manages to queer desire. By making a 
transgender woman an object of desire, transgender people seem more “normal” in the 
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eyes of the audience. Even if Kitten is not represented as erotic to the viewer, the fact that 
other characters see her as desirable introduces the idea that a non-binary person can also 
be the object of love, which makes transgender people, as they are, seem acceptable in 
their queerness. 
2.3.4 NORMALISATION 
Being capable of giving and receiving love is a good way of normalising alternative 
gender identities and sexualities. This shows how people who have been classified as other 
have more in common with our values and lives than one might at first believe. According 
to Agid (2006: 24), it is important for films, like most mainstream media, to construct 
transgender bodies as “normal” in order to make trans people more understandable and 
tolerated. In addition to romantic love, normalisation can also occur through representing 
transgender people in the context of family. Representing Bree as a parent may be seen as 
a way of normalising her character. The love between child and parent is also represented 
through Kitten who searches for her mother but ends up finding her father. However, 
parenthood can, in addition to being normalising, also represent the possibility of new and 
queer kinship models. 
Transamerica ends with a rather queer family model. Bree as a woman has never 
had sexual intercourse; however, she has a son who was conceived by Stanley. Toby does 
not know the truth for most of their road trip and actually ends up making a move on Bree 
(a twist on the story of Oedipus). Toby escapes after finding out who Bree really is and that 
she has been lying to him. In the end of the film, after Bree has had her surgery, Toby 
returns, which suggests that they may attempt to become a family. This family model 
would be extremely non-normative as Bree would simultaneously be and not be Toby’s 
father and mother. However, this queer solution seems the most acceptable option in the 
context of the film. The nuclear family model is subverted in Breakfast on Pluto as well. 
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Kitten is driven back to her father instead of her mother, which results in a queer family 
model: Father Liam taking care of Kitten and the pregnant unwed Charlie. Although they 
make it work, society cannot accept them and their home is burned down. In the end of the 
film, Kitten and Charlie have to start a new life in London, which promises more safety. 
They, upon the arrival of Charlie’s baby, also create a queer image of a new family model. 
Both films end with a hopeful future for their transgender protagonists. Bree and 
Kitten are shown as having a place in the world, although not the most conventional one. 
This aligns with Butler’s (2004: 105) claim that legitimacy and illegitimacy are not the 
only two options for existence; there is an outside domain that has not yet been figured as 
either one or the other. This is the domain that Bree and Kitten seem to belong to, as they 
remain on the boarder of acceptance and rejection. A discourse that could fully represent 
the rest of their lives in film does not yet exist, but there is a promise of a positive outcome 
for transgender people. Although, at the end of the films, the protagonists remain 
marginalised by society in general, the directors have produced spaces in which the ruling 
hegemonic norms can be subverted and in which transgender people are accepted by other 
people. The subversion is further added to by the normalisation of the characters to the 
audience. It is not the following of binary gender or the subversion of gender identity that 
makes the characters more or less “normal”; it is the fact that the films interpellate their 
transgender protagonists as subjects who are truly and viably human. 
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 CONCLUSION 
 
The aim of this paper is to provide insight into the relationship between film and 
gender ideology, which is of great importance as films have the power to produce and 
uphold ideology. People perceive films as only a means of entertainment as a result of 
which they do not critically analyse whether the information represented in a film covertly 
represent the ruling ideology. As a film can provide viewers with topics that they might not 
otherwise encounter in their lives, it is possible to influence people's perceptions on these 
topics. Films can both make visible or conceal certain issues or gender identities, such as 
homosexuality and transgender, which means that the audience receives either a broader or 
more limited view on a particular topic. Therefore, analysing the relationship between film 
and gender ideology is necessary in order to reveal what type of information is transmitted 
to the audience. Since the meanings represented in a film are ambiguous and allow 
different readings, the viewer may provide multiple interpretations of the ideas a film 
conveys. Nevertheless, a ‘preferred’ reading is encoded into the text, necessitating the 
study of the dominant ideology.  
The ruling gender ideology most represented in films is the binary heterosexual 
hegemony. In this system people are interpellated into subjecthood through the process of 
hailing them as either male or female and their subject-status is made dependent on their 
stable binary gender identity. Subjectivity itself is necessary in order for a person to be 
considered truly human. The ruling gender ideology is built upon the idea that the 
formation of subjects is a natural process that derives from an internal gender identity. 
However, it is concealed that this ideology is built on the basis of exclusionary practices. 
The ruling gender ideology does not recognise genders outside the binary, as a result of 
which alternative or transgressive genders are claimed unintelligible and are stigmatised 
and marginalised. Since subject formation is done in a way that the exclusions become 
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invisible and the process seems natural, any gender identity that does not fit into the binary 
mould is labelled unnatural. 
In order to counter this exclusionary view of gender, it is necessary to reveal the 
constructedness of the seeming naturalness of sex and the subject, which is taken up by 
Judith Butler in her works Gender Trouble and Bodies that Matter. She believes that 
gender does not derive from an internal gender identity but that it is the result of reiterative 
gender performances. Her theory is based on the fact that one cannot access a subject or 
sex prior to the mark of gender. Therefore, gender ideology influences both the 
construction of the subject as well as its sex. According to Butler, interpellation as a gender 
is not a singular act that happens once at the moment of birth but a process that takes place 
based on the repetition of gendered acts. The ruling ideology demands repeated acts of 
gender to be performed according to the norm in order for subject-status to be achieved. 
However, since the norm is built on the idea of being natural, which Butler claims it is not, 
then everyone is bound to fail at one point and create permutations of the norm. This 
shows how the system works against itself by creating possibilities of subversion. 
The existence of transgressive identities, such as transgender, intersex and bisexual, 
is subversive in that it reveals how the ruling gender system is constructed on the basis of 
exclusion. Although these identities exist in the periphery, they are still part of the gender 
system. For Butler, the idea of performative gender opens the possibility of performing 
gender in a way that undermines the system from within. This is best exemplified through 
transgender, which can expose the performative construction of the “natural” categories of 
gender and displace our understanding of the reality of gender. However, performing 
gender in a subversive way puts subjectivity under risk and transgender people, who 
already have difficulties safely existing within the gender system, may not be interested in 
or willing to risk their status of humanity for the aim of revolutionising gender. 
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Although Butler advocates the deconstruction of gender in an attempt to widen our 
understanding of how gender is constituted, which would allow the inclusion of trans 
people, her argumentation is often considered too distant from everyday life. Both feminist 
and transgender theorists have criticised Butler’s approaches as unsuitable for solving real-
life issues concerning political movements and gender minorities, which need labels in 
order for it to be possible to talk about them. Although this is seen as a weakness, it is also 
a strength that Butler does not try to group gender minorities together based on common 
identity, which tends to exclude differences. Butler takes into account the diversity within 
these minorities by criticising the concept of identity categories. Her theory aims to disrupt 
and queer people’s understanding of gender in a way that would create a new type of 
politics through social transformation that would make non-binary gender identities 
accepted as well. However, Butler’s theory of subverting the gender system is perceived as 
idealist and transgender theorists and activists suggest a more practical approach to the 
study of transgender. In order to keep Butler’s criticism in the context of trans in mind, the 
film analysis of this paper was concerned with both the representation of Butler’s 
theoretical concepts as well as the social issues that transgender people face in their 
everyday lives. 
Both films analysed in this paper have abandoned the overly stereotypical and 
stigmatised representation that transgender has been subjected to in the past. However, 
these films still exist within the ruling gender discourse as a result of which they carry the 
ideas of binary heterosexuality. The films encourage a different reading: Transamerica 
seems rather normative in the representation of the transgender identity while Breakfast on 
Pluto appears queerer and less conformist to the binary system. Interpellation of the 
protagonists reveals what type of gender ideology the films follow. Transamerica’s 
protagonist Bree clearly upholds the norms of dichotomous gender identity, as the film 
65 
 
constantly emphasises her aim to pass as female and to erase her past as a man through sex 
reassignment surgery. Bree, who is played by a female actor, is interpellated as a woman 
and her male side is made invisible. Presenting gender as either one or the other reinforces 
the binary model. Breakfast on Pluto does not make its protagonist Kitten’s transgender as 
prominent compared to other aspects in the plot. Kitten, who is played by a male actor, is 
interpellated as both male and female in different parts of the film, which suggests that she 
does not need to follow the binary system in order to be intelligible to the audience. 
Consequently, the interpellation of Kitten seems to follow a more subversive view of 
gender as it advocates the possibility of being simultaneously male and female. 
Linguistic performativity is conveyed in the films through the limitations that 
performative speech acts have to represent transgender. Bree represents the impossibility 
of naming her, as language is gender-specific. While wanting to avoid being called by male 
terms, she does not feel completely able to refer to herself as “fully” female. Since Bree 
follows the idea of normative gender and wants to be accepted in society as female after 
her surgery, she refrains from demanding complete acceptance in her transition phase. This 
is a result of her fear of marginalisation, which is why she seeks security in conformism. 
Kitten is referred to in the film by both male and female terms; however, she prefers 
female pronouns. Although the film represents her as being called a boy at the beginning 
and a girl at the end of the film, its main emphasis is on the fact that it does not matter 
which gender she is. Hence, Breakfast on Pluto suggests that the speech act that hails one 
as a gender should not be made more important than the individual who it references. 
Since films do not produce ideology in an obvious way and its effects on the 
audience are not direct, they can both reinforce the dominant gender ideology or subvert it. 
Many elements in Transamerica and Breakfast on Pluto can be analysed in a nuanced 
manner. One reading of the character’s performances of femininity, based on their hyper-
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feminine clothing, supports the claim of the ruling gender ideology that transgender 
attempts to imitate binariness, while another reading suggests the possibility of subverting 
the heterosexual binary system, as their overly feminine apparel can be considered as 
revealing the unnaturalness of the demand of femininity. The reading depends on the 
audience. 
Both films represent the normative gender ideology as well as demonstrate the 
performative and subversive nature of gender. While Transamerica may seem to be full of 
gender stereotypes, it also contains moments of queerness; and Breakfast on Pluto, which 
seems to be highly transgressive in its representation of gender, also represents several 
values of normative gender ideology. Kitten is shown to perform femininity without any 
difficulty, unlike Bree, who reveals that acts such as a high voice, “feminine” posture and 
manner of walking are a culturally constructed demand made on all women who want to be 
considered feminine. This suggests, and coincides with Butler’s claim, that femininity does 
not come from an internal gender identity but is something that can be practised and taught 
and it is the performance of femininity that constitutes female gender.  
The issues that trans people face, in addition to the problems of performing binary 
gender, concern their interaction with others. The films represent the discrimination that 
trans people face in society as well as in smaller communities. Neither character is shown 
to be able to find regular employment, which is suggested is because of their ambiguous 
gender. Their trans identities are also the reason that Bree and Kitten are shunned by their 
families. However, both films are more ambivalent than previous films with transgender 
characters since they show a more positive image of the possibility of having viable lives 
and personal contact with other people. A symbolic connection is made in both films 
between transgender and other marginal identities. Not only are the protagonists more 
accepted by outsider communities, as opposed to dominant culture, but the allegory 
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between trans identity and other minorities, for example race, show how they share a 
similar subjugation by the ruling ideology. 
Outcast communities are also where the films represent the possibility of romantic 
relationships. Both films are heteronormative as the trans women protagonists are attracted 
to men. However, the desire that others have towards them is more interesting. Bree is not 
made sexually attractive to the audience nor is she an object of desire to other characters in 
the film. If the possibility of romance exists for Bree then it is postponed to a time after her 
surgery, which supports the binary heterosexual norm. Kitten is presented as attractive to 
the audience and sexually appealing to numerous characters in the film. Although the men 
who she has closer relationships with are conveyed as fellow outcasts, the film queers 
desire by making a trans woman the object of love. Therefore, Breakfast on Pluto 
represents sexuality in a more elaborate way than Transamerica. 
Through the representation of transgender characters as the objects of romantic love 
and the possibility of them having a family, the films manage to normalise transgender in 
the eyes of the audience. Both protagonists, although marginalised by dominant culture, 
find a place of acceptance in the world. Bree goes through with her surgery as a result of 
which she is more freely able to interact with others and her seclusion in her in-between 
gender state comes to an end. She is also reunited with her son Toby who can become the 
accepting family she never had growing up. Kitten also creates a new family model with 
her friend Charlie and her baby in London. The big city provides more opportunities for 
Kitten to perform her ambiguous gender in a safer and more accepting environment. Thus, 
the films end with the idea that transgender people can have viable lives, which suggests 
that they encourage a non-marginalising reading of transgender. 
This paper adds to the body of research done in the field of transgender film studies 
by analysing two contemporary films, Transamerica and Breakfast on Pluto, from the 
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perspective of transgender identity and performativity, which in turn enable to see what 
type of transgender images people are introduced to. It is not possible, based on the 
analysis of these two films, to make generalising conclusions about how transgender is 
represented in contemporary films. However, it is evident, based on the history of 
transgender in film, that the representation of transgender has made great progress in time: 
from lack of representation to stigmatisation to farce and now to these relatively 
normalising films. It seems that transgender follows a similar path to the representation of 
homosexuality in popular culture. Currently, transgender people are much less represented 
in films than gays but the tendency seems to be growing. 
The films analysed in this paper show different degrees of ambiguous gender 
performances, some of them more subtle than others, which means that the audience might 
not notice all the subversive elements among the otherwise normative gender matrix that 
surrounds the films. Future research in this field is necessary in order to observe how the 
representation of transgender will evolve, whether transgender films take the direction of 
normalisation by presenting transgender people through a binary lens or celebrated in their 
queerness. Since there are a myriad of transgender identities, it is important for the body of 
transgender films to represent various identities in order for the audience to acquire a wider 
understanding of what trans can be like. Furthermore, future transgender film studies 
should pay more attention to the social, cultural and political reality that transgender exist 
in, which is not represented in this paper, as this would create awareness of not only what 
transgender people are like but explain why their situation is the way it is. 
It is important to represent transgressive choices as viable in addition to normative 
genders since many transgender people do not, and should not be forced to, fit the binary 
norm. As films, and media images in general, are the first source of information on 
alternative gender identities that people, especially young people, can turn to, it is 
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important that they show acceptance towards diversity in order to make people realise that 
they are not alone in their difference. Moreover, for the acceptance and understanding of 
different transgender people to appear, it is necessary for films to not only normalise the 
traditional binary trans identities, such as Bree in Transamerica, but also represent 
ambiguous trans people as “normal”, such as Kitten in Breakfast on Pluto. This would 
ultimately coincide with Butler’s aim, which is not to queer transgender, but rather queer 
the way we think about gender and its modes of production in the first place. 
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Annotatsioon: 
 
Antud töö eesmärgiks on uurida transidentiteedi ja performatiivsuse kujutamist kahes 
2005. aastal ilmunud filmis „Transameerika“ ja „Hommikusöök Pluutol“. Töö annab 
ülevaate sellest, kuidas kujutatakse kahte trans-naist ning nende elu traditsiooniliselt 
binaarses heteroseksuaalses ühiskonnas. Teooria on üles ehitatud Judith Butleri teostele 
„Sekeldused sooga“ (1990) ning „Kehad, millel on kaalu“ (1993), mis uurivad 
sooidentiteeti ning subversiivset performatiivsust, mida esineb ka analüüsitavates filmides. 
Töö on üles ehitatud kahe filmi peategelaste kontrastiivsele analüüsile. Kui 
„Transameerika“ peategelane Bree on binaarsuse poole kalduv transseksuaal, siis 
„Hommikusöök Pluutol“ peategelane Kitten kujutab soo ja seksuaalsuse piire 
ebaselgemalt. Filmide süvaanalüüs näitab, et ideoloogia järgimist ning selle õõnestamist 
leidub mõlemas filmis. Tegelaste mittebinaarne identiteet ning käitumine põhjustavad 
pingeid, mille tõttu Bree ja Kitten on ühiskonna poolt tõrjutud. Varasemate trans-filmidega 
võrreldes kujutavad antud filmid aga peategelasi eelkõige positiivsete 
tulevikuväljavaadetega. Bree ja Kitteni tegelaskujude analüüs jõuab järelduseni, et ehkki 
üks film muudab trans-soolisust normatiivsemaks ning teine mitte-binaarsemaks, siis 
mõlemad filmid kujutavad oma trans-peategelasi vaataja silmis eluvõimelistena ning 
inimlikus valguses. 
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